Wood v. City of San Diego
678 F.3d 1075
9th Cir.2012Background
- Wood, a longtime City employee, retired in 2005 and participated in the City's defined benefit pension plan administered by SDCERS; survivor benefits are governed by SDMC § 24.0601 and related provisions, requiring contributions and benefit structures neutral to sex; Wood, then single, selected the surviving spouse benefit and elected to treat survivor contributions as additional voluntary contributions.
- If single at retirement, a surviving-spouse benefit option provides either a lump-sum refund of survivor contributions or an increased pension funded by those contributions; Wood chose the latter, increasing her monthly benefit.
- Wood alleged that the aggregate cost of surviving-spouse benefits is higher for married retirees and that men are more likely married, creating a disparate impact on women under Title VII/FEHA.
- District court initially dismissed Wood’s Title VII claims for lack of standing and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims; on appeal, a different panel reversed on standing and exhaustion, remanding for development of record.
- After remand, the City moved to dismiss Wood’s Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact claims; the district court dismissed the disparate treatment claim for failure to allege discriminatory intent and dismissed the disparate impact claim (standing or merits), leading to the current affirmance by the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disparate treatment: sufficiency of discriminatory intent | Wood alleges the City adopted the policy with knowledge of its discriminatory effects as to women. | City did not adopt a discriminatory purpose; policy facially neutral once Manhart-based equalization occurred. | Dismissed for lack of alleging discriminatory intent under Rule 12(b)(6). |
| Leave to amend the disparate treatment claim | Wood should be allowed to amend to plead discriminatory intent. | Amendment would be futile; no facts show discriminatory intent. | District court did not abuse in denying further leave to amend. |
| Article III standing for disparate impact claim | Wood suffered an injury-in-fact because marriage status could affect retirement benefits. | Injuries are conjectural; cannot show concrete, particularized injury from neutral plan. | Standing dismissed; even if intertwined, Manhart forecloses disparate impact claim as a matter of law. |
| Intertwining of jurisdictional and merits issues | Jurisdictional and merits questions are intertwined; should review as merits-based. | Intertwined questions need not convert to merits review; resolution shows claim foreclosed. | Court affirms on other grounds; no need to remand for merits. |
| Viability of disparate impact claim after Manhart | Even neutral survivor benefits can violate Title VII due to disparate impact. | Manhart forecloses disparate impact claims where plan is facially neutral and allowed under Equal Pay Act differential. | Foreclosed as a matter of law; Manhart controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (U.S. 1978) (held pension contributions/benefits must be facially neutral; disparate impact not actionable in that context)
- Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (U.S. 1983) (pension benefits must be facially neutral as well)
- Hazel-Atlas v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (U.S. 1993) (discriminatory motive may be inferred from facially discriminatory policy in some contexts)
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (U.S. 2009) (disparate-treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent or motive)
- American Federation of State, County, & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (establishes that awareness of adverse impact is not alone sufficient for liability)
