Wong v. Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises, Inc.
1:20-cv-01470
N.D. Ill.Mar 5, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Emily Wong was hired by Lettuce Entertain You Enterprises (LEYE) as a public relations associate and worked frequently with director Ryan Arnold.
- On November 5, 2018, Wong alleges Arnold engaged in nonconsensual sexual conduct at his residence (kissing, groping, reaching under clothing); she left and later reported the incident to LEYE HR on November 12.
- LEYE HR questioned her about why she was at Arnold’s home and described firing Arnold as “drastic”; LEYE then restricted Wong’s work assignments, removed her from media events, disabled her email access, placed her on paid leave, and others began performing her core duties.
- Wong filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), opted out of the IDHR investigatory process, received a right-to-sue notice, and filed suit in Illinois state court; LEYE removed the case to federal court.
- LEYE moved to dismiss Counts IV–IX (vicarious liability, sexual harassment, retaliatory discharge, negligent supervision, Illinois Whistleblower Act claims). The court granted dismissal in part and denied in part, dismissing Counts IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX without prejudice and denying dismissal of Count V.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Count IV: Vicarious liability | Wong seeks to hold LEYE vicariously liable for Arnold’s acts. | LEYE: Vicarious liability is not an independent cause of action. | Dismissed without prejudice; court: vicarious liability not a standalone claim but leave to amend to plead viable employer liability theory. |
| Count V: Sexual harassment / IHRA preemption | Wong: she opted out of IDHR investigation, received right-to-sue, filed in circuit court, so IHRA does not preempt her state-court claim. | LEYE: IHRA preempts state-law claims for civil-rights-type employment claims like sexual harassment. | Denied — Count V survives. Court interprets IHRA opt-out (775 ILCS 5/7A-102(C-1)) as permitting suit in circuit court after opting out. |
| Count VI: Retaliatory discharge | Wong: alleges retaliatory discharge based on employer response. | LEYE: Complaint pleads only constructive discharge (insufficient) and fails to show violation of a clear public policy. | Dismissed without prejudice — plaintiff waived response on constructive-discharge point; Illinois law requires actual discharge and a clear public-policy violation. |
| Count VII: Negligent supervision (IWCA preemption) | Wong: seeks punitive damages and claims negligent supervision by LEYE. | LEYE: IWCA is exclusive remedy for workplace injuries; claim preempted unless injury non-accidental or outside employment. | Dismissed with prejudice as pleaded (without prejudice to amend) — court finds plaintiff’s injuries arise from employment and are barred by IWCA. |
| Count VIII: Illinois Whistleblower Act (general) | Wong sought leave to replead but did not address LEYE’s arguments in response brief. | LEYE: attacks claim on the merits. | Dismissed without prejudice — court grants leave to amend but notes deficiencies. |
| Count IX: IWA §20.1 (disclosure of public corruption/wrongdoing) | Wong: notice pleading suffices; claim sufficiently pled. | LEYE: Complaint contains no allegation of public corruption or wrongdoing as required by §20.1. | Dismissed without prejudice — complaint contains no allegation of disclosure of public corruption/wrongdoing; leave to amend granted only if Rule 11-compliant. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must give fair notice and be plausible)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2007) (accept well-pleaded facts on motion to dismiss)
- McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (plausibility standard application)
- Wilson v. Edward Hosp., 981 N.E.2d 971 (Ill. 2012) (vicarious liability not a standalone cause of action)
- Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 151 Ill.2d 142 (Ill. 1992) (retaliatory discharge requires actual discharge)
- Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. 1990) (Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity analysis)
- Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006) (IHRA jurisdictional exclusivity principles)
- Walker v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 915 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 2019) (elements of retaliatory discharge under Illinois law)
- Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2017) (IWCA exclusivity)