Women First OB/GYN Associates, L.L.C. v. Harris
232 Md. App. 647
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2017Background
- Harris sued OB-GYN Dr. LaKeischa McMillan and her employer Women First for negligence arising from a laparoscopic hysterectomy that injured Harris’s left ureter; Women First was sued only vicariously (respondeat superior).
- On the eve of trial counsel announced dismissal of McMillan; an oral stipulation (and later a docket entry) reflected a dismissal “with prejudice,” and a separate filed stipulation stated McMillan acted within the scope of employment.
- At trial the court denied Women First’s motion for judgment that the dismissal of McMillan barred vicarious liability; the court exercised revisory power to amend the dismissal to “without prejudice.”
- The jury found McMillan negligent and held Women First vicariously liable, awarding Harris damages; Women First’s post-trial JNOV was denied.
- The central legal question: does a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice of an employee-defendant, made for no consideration and absent a release or adjudication on the merits, preclude the plaintiff from pursuing the same tort claim against the employer under respondeat superior?
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary dismissal with prejudice of employee bars vicarious claim against employer | Dismissal without consideration is procedural only and does not release employer; Harris may pursue respondeat superior | Dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits that exonerates the employee and thus precludes derivative liability | Court held dismissal without consideration is not equivalent to a release or adjudication on the merits and does not bar vicarious claim |
| Whether trial court erred in exercising revisory power to convert dismissal to without prejudice | Harris argued court properly amended an interlocutory ruling and had revisory power under Rule 2-602 | Women First argued revisory power was limited and Rule 2-535 applied | Court held revisory power valid because no final judgment existed; revision was within discretion and harmless since primary ruling affirmed |
| Whether court erred in permitting rebuttal testimony from Dr. Karr (fact/expert) | Harris argued rebuttal proper because defense experts presented new, undisclosed opinions about pyelogram causation/location | Women First argued Karr’s testimony was not true rebuttal and Harris failed to designate him as an expert | Court held no abuse of discretion: defense experts offered new matter at trial, Karr’s testimony directly rebutted it, and trial court properly managed discovery prejudice |
| Whether denial of motions for judgment/JNOV was error given dismissal of McMillan | Harris: vicarious claim viable; employee not necessary party; plaintiff’s dismissal didn’t extinguish principal’s liability absent release/consideration | Women First: dismissal with prejudice extinguishes claim against agent and therefore principal as matter of law | Court denied judgment/JNOV; affirmed that principal can be liable where employee’s fault is litigated or where no release/consideration was given for dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403 (1883) (plaintiff may sue agent, principal, or both; agent not necessary party)
- Southern Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461 (2003) (exoneration of employee by verdict precludes respondeat superior liability)
- Anne Arundel Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Condon, 102 Md. App. 408 (1994) (release of agent discharges principal under common-law agency where principal has no independent fault)
- Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (meaning and preclusive effect of “adjudication on the merits” depends on context and applicable law)
- Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991) (voluntary dismissal with prejudice treated as adjudication on merits for preclusion under applicable state law)
- Riffey v. Tonder, 36 Md. App. 633 (1977) (rebuttal evidence standard; admissibility of rebuttal is within trial court discretion)
- Claibourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684 (1997) (final judgment and separate-document requirement principles referenced in context of finality/revisory power)