Womac v. State
302 Ga. 681
| Ga. | 2017Background
- In June 2014 a Whitfield County grand jury indicted Lawrence Womac on 13 counts relating to sexual offenses against a minor (K.W.); after trial he was convicted on aggravated sexual battery (Count 5), child molestation (Count 9), cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 11), and false imprisonment (Count 12).
- Trial evidence: K.W. testified Womac digitally penetrated her in a motel room, followed her into a bathroom where he restrained and assaulted her, licked her vagina, and then penetrated her with his penis; she also reported an earlier incident days prior involving forced contact and oral sex.
- Medical exam documented bruising, abrasions, and vaginal redness consistent with K.W.’s account; surveillance and other-act witnesses corroborated presence and prior similar misconduct.
- Jury was instructed, on the rape count only, that persons under 16 cannot consent to sexual intercourse; the aggravated sexual battery charge was charged as penetration with a foreign object (finger) "without the consent of that person" and the jury was not told the age-presumed-incapacity rule for that count.
- At trial one other-acts witness (Womac’s daughter) briefly stated she used him for marijuana; the court admonished the jury and denied a mistrial motion.
- Sentencing: life on the aggravated sexual battery count, additional consecutive and concurrent terms on other counts; Womac appealed raising constitutional and merger and evidentiary claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether life sentence for aggravated sexual battery is cruel and unusual because offense is strict liability due to presumption of lack of consent from victim’s age | Womac: jury was allowed to treat minor’s lack of consent as presumed by law so aggravated sexual battery became strict liability, producing an excessive life sentence | State: jury was not instructed that minors are incapable of consenting for aggravated sexual battery; the jury still had to find actual lack of consent | Court: Rejected Womac’s constitutional claim — jury was not instructed that age alone established lack of consent for aggravated sexual battery, so no strict liability or Eighth Amendment issue |
| Whether trial court erred by denying mistrial after witness’s unsolicited remark she used Womac for marijuana | Womac: remark introduced prejudicial bad-character/evidence and required mistrial | State: remark was fleeting, court promptly instructed jury to disregard, other strong evidence supported verdict | Court: Denial of mistrial was not an abuse of discretion — admonition and case context cured the error |
| Whether convictions for aggravated sexual battery, child molestation, and cruelty to children should merge for sentencing | Womac: offenses arose from the same conduct and should merge | State: offenses required different elements and some acts occurred at different times/locations | Court: No merger — required-evidence test shows each offense requires proof the others do not; some acts completed before subsequent acts so separate offenses |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718 (discusses requirement to prove lack of consent for sexual battery)
- Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551 (standard for reviewing denial of mistrial for improper bad-character evidence)
- Sampson v. State, 282 Ga. 82 (presumption that jurors follow trial court instructions)
- Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172 (standard of review and merger law overview)
- Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (required-evidence test for merger of offenses)
- Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (distinguishing merger as matter of law vs fact)
- Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557 (separate crimes where one completed before the commission of subsequent crime)