302 Ga. 681
Ga.2017Background
- In July 2013, Lawrence Womac invited minor K.W. into his motel room and committed multiple sexual acts, including digital penetration, oral and penile penetration, and physical restraint; K.W. later reported the assaults and medical exam showed injuries consistent with assault.
- Surveillance showed K.W. entering and later leaving Womac’s room alone; Womac attempted to leave the state soon after and his motel bathroom had been bleached.
- Two other witnesses testified to prior sexual assaults by Womac; Womac’s daughter testified as an other-acts witness and briefly said she "used him for marijuana."
- A Whitfield County jury convicted Womac of aggravated sexual battery (Count 5), child molestation (Count 9), cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 11), and false imprisonment (Count 12); he was sentenced to life on Count 5 and additional terms on the other counts.
- On appeal, Womac raised (1) a Georgia-constitutional cruel-and-unusual challenge to his life sentence arguing aggravated sexual battery was treated as strict liability as to consent, (2) that the trial court erred by denying a mistrial after the daughter’s marijuana remark, and (3) that several convictions should have merged for sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Womac) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether life sentence for aggravated sexual battery violates Georgia Constitution as cruel and unusual because statute treats consent as presumed by victim's age (strict liability) | Aggravated sexual battery was effectively strict liability because jury could treat lack of consent as conclusively shown by victim's age, making life sentence disproportionate | Jury was not instructed that a minor is legally incapable of consenting as to aggravated sexual battery; jury had to find lack of consent factually, so no strict liability or constitutional violation | Rejected. Jury was required to find actual lack of consent; constitutional challenge fails |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying mistrial after daughter’s testimony that she "used him for marijuana" | The statement injected improper bad-character evidence requiring mistrial | Statement was fleeting; court promptly instructed jury to disregard; other evidence against Womac was strong; jurors presumed to follow instructions | Rejected. No abuse of discretion in refusing mistrial |
| Whether aggravated sexual battery, child molestation, and cruelty to children should have merged for sentencing | Counts arose from same conduct and should merge under OCGA §16-1-7 so defendant cannot be punished multiple times for same offense | The crimes were completed at different times and each requires proof of an element the others do not; thus no merger | Rejected. Crimes separate as a matter of law and under the required-evidence test; convictions need not merge |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. State, 297 Ga. 718 (2015) (victim lack of consent is an element of sexual battery requiring proof)
- Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (2006) (required-evidence test for merger of offenses)
- Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551 (2016) (standard for reviewing denial of mistrial for improper admission of bad-character evidence)
- Sampson v. State, 282 Ga. 82 (2007) (jurors presumed to follow trial court instructions)
- Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172 (2016) (merger review is de novo)
- Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842 (2015) (discussing merger as a matter of law vs. fact)
- Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557 (1988) (separate crimes where one completed before subsequent crime)