99 A.D.3d 58
N.Y. App. Div.2012Background
- Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. sues attorney Howard Stern in a legal malpractice action over a failed 1031 like-kind exchange related to the sale of 496 Broadway, Manhattan.
- Plaintiffs claim defendant assured they could structure the sale as a 1031 exchange and facilitate the tax deferral, while defendant contends he lacked expertise and the clients bore responsibility.
- In November 2006, defendant drafted a sale contract; at the May 29, 2007 closing, purchase proceeds totaling $10.2 million were paid to the plaintiff rather than to a qualified intermediary.
- Defendant allegedly advised the Yungs to proceed with 1031 despite his admitted lack of experience, while the Yungs insisted on the plaintiff receiving the funds directly for the exchange.
- Post-closing, efforts to redo the transaction for a 1031 exchange failed; the plaintiff sought to prove damages from the lost tax deferral, including a $5.1 million immediate tax liability.
- The motion court granted summary judgment for defendant, holding plaintiff failed to prove proximate causation; the appellate majority affirmed, while a dissent argued proximate causation could be shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiff's losses | Ying asserts negligence caused failure of 1031. | Stern contends no proximate causation proved. | Summary judgment proper; no triable fact on causation. |
| Whether the checks payable to plaintiff destroyed 1031 eligibility | Proceeds to plaintiff prevented 1031 treatment. | Plaintiffs insisted on checks to plaintiff; defendant not at fault. | Failure to use a qualified intermediary precludes 1031; causation not shown. |
| Whether plaintiff could prove a viable replacement property within statutory time frames | Evidence showed potential replacement and funding power within 45/180 days. | No evidence of timely identification or closing; burden not met. | Plaintiff failed to raise material fact on timely 1031 replacement. |
| Whether expert testimony was required to prove proximate causation | Expert affidavit necessary per Suppiah v Kalish. | Governing facts are undisputed; no expert needed. | No expert required; proximate cause can be decided on a factual record. |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given disputed facts | There are factual issues about causation and replacement property. | Evidence shows no causal link and no viable 1031 plan. | Yes, summary judgment affirmed; no triable issues on proximate causation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brooks v. Lewin, 21 A.D.3d 731 (2005) (negligence plus proximate causation required for malpractice claim)
- Markowitz v. Kurzman Eisenberg Corbin Lever & Goodman, LLP, 82 A.D.3d 719 (2011) (proximate cause essential for malpractice recovery)
- Leder v. Spiegel, 31 A.D.3d 266 (2006) (negligence without proximate cause dismissal)
- Suppiah v. Kalish, 76 A.D.3d 829 (2010) (expert affidavit required in complex issues where causation is unsettled)
- Glauber v. P. S. F. B. Assoc., 89 A.D.2d 576 (1982) (courts avoid requiring futile actions)
- Lo Biondo v. D'Auria, 45 A.D.2d 735 (1974) (no obligation to take futile actions in litigation)
- Fielding v. Kupferman, 65 A.D.3d 437 (2009) (attorney must know applicable law or research it)
