WM Mobile Bay Environmental Center, Inc. v. The City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority, 972 F.3d 1240

Background

WM Mobile obtained a $6,034,045.50 judgment against the City of Mobile Solid Waste Authority (the Authority) and sought execution against a 104‑acre parcel (the West Tract) owned by the Authority.
The Authority bought the West Tract in 1994 and has held it unused for landfill expansion; it asserts the land is held for public use.
The Authority is a public corporation created under Ala. Code Chapter 89A by the City of Mobile; it has some municipal-like features but is legally a separate public corporation.
WM Mobile argued § 6‑10‑10 and common law exemptions do not protect property owned by a public corporation; the Authority argued the West Tract either “belongs to” the City for § 6‑10‑10 or is otherwise exempt as public‑use property.
The district court quashed the writ of execution, concluding the West Tract was exempt under Ala. Code § 6‑10‑10.
Because Alabama law is unsettled on whether § 6‑10‑10 and the alleged common‑law public‑use exemption reach property owned by solid waste authorities (and on how to treat long‑unused, statutorily restricted property), the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Alabama Supreme Court rather than resolving them itself.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (WM Mobile)	Defendant's Argument (Authority)	Held
1. Can property owned by a solid waste disposal authority “belong[] to” a county or municipality for purposes of § 6‑10‑10?	§6‑10‑10 applies only to property legally owned by counties/municipalities; the Authority is a separate public corporation so its property is not covered.	Because of the Authority’s statutory ties and purpose, its property should be treated as belonging to the City for §6‑10‑10 purposes.	No definitive ruling; question certified to the Alabama Supreme Court.
2. If so, what factors should courts consider when determining whether such property ‘‘belongs to’’ the municipality?	N/A (argues the plain statutory ownership test controls).	Courts should consider statutory purpose, structural ties, control by municipality, and disposition rules on dissolution.	No definitive ruling; question certified to the Alabama Supreme Court.
3. Is property of an authority “used for county or municipal purposes” under §6‑10‑10 when it is unused but statutorily restricted for future public use?	Long nonuse means property is not being used for municipal purposes; §6‑10‑10’s “use” requirement therefore fails.	Statutory restrictions and the Authority’s limited powers make even long‑unused holdings public in purpose; temporary/noncurrent use should not defeat the exemption.	No definitive ruling; question certified to the Alabama Supreme Court.
4. Does Alabama continue to recognize a common‑law exemption from execution for property used for public purposes (Gardner rule)?	N/A (WM Mobile argues statutory scheme occupies field and abrogates any broad common‑law exemption).	Gardner and related precedent preserve a public‑use common‑law protection for entities created to perform public functions.	No definitive ruling; question certified to the Alabama Supreme Court.
5. If Gardner survives, does that common‑law exemption apply to public corporations like the Authority, and what standards govern it?	N/A (argues any such common‑law exemption should not extend to public corporations whose property is subject to statutory execution rules).	The common‑law exemption should apply to public corporations performing public duties; courts should protect property necessary to discharge those duties.	No definitive ruling; question certified to the Alabama Supreme Court.

Key Cases Cited

Hamrick Construction Corp. v. Rainsville Housing Auth., 447 So. 2d 1295 (Ala. 1984) (housing authority property treated as municipal for exemption under a statute that incorporates §6‑10‑10).
Rainsville Housing Auth. v. Hamrick Construction Corp., 456 So. 2d 38 (Ala. 1984) (officers of housing authorities may be subject to mandamus; noted statutory language treating authorities as public bodies).
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Talladega v. Consol. Publ’g, Inc., 892 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 2004) (public corporation performing municipal functions may be treated as performing a municipal function for some purposes).
Knight v. W. Ala. Envtl. Improvement Auth., 246 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1971) (public corporations are separate entities and not subdivisions of the State for constitutional debt‑limit purposes).
Gardner v. Mobile & N.W.R. Co., 15 So. 271 (Ala. 1894) (articulates common‑law public‑use exemption for corporations created to serve public purposes).
Murphree v. City of Mobile, 16 So. 544 (Ala. 1894) (municipal property held unused and not designated for public use did not qualify for exemption).
Russell & Johnson v. Town of Oneonta, 73 So. 986 (Ala. 1917) (temporary nonuse does not destroy municipal public‑use exemption).
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 2002) (public corporations and their funds treated as separate from the municipality for certain statutory purposes).
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (principles of federalism and comity favor certifying unsettled state law questions to the state supreme court).