Witt v. Village of Mamaroneck
992 F. Supp. 2d 350
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Plaintiffs David and Kinuyo Witt purchased a Mamaroneck, NY home in 2009 that was substantially damaged by Hurricane Irene in 2011 and applied for a building permit to make repairs.
- Village Building Inspector Robert Melillo initially approved a permit; after work was half complete he issued a verbal stop-work order and declared the repairs a "substantial improvement" under Chapter 186 (flood-damage rules), requiring elevation or a variance.
- Plaintiffs sought a variance from the Village Planning Board, paid escrow, attended hearings, and ultimately received a variance with conditions that deferred but preserved future elevation obligations; Melillo indicated state variances might also be required.
- Plaintiffs ran out of funds during the delay, defaulted on their mortgage, and sued the Village, the Planning Board, and Melillo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection, substantive and procedural due process, and brought a Monell claim; state-law claims were withdrawn.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) (ripeness) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). The court denied the ripeness challenge but granted dismissal on the merits, with leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness of federal claims based on Melillo’s stop-work order and variance requirement | Witt: Melillo’s determinations were final and produced concrete injury; federal claims are ripe. | Village: Melillo’s actions were not a final decision; federal claims are unripe. | Court: Claims are ripe — the Board’s variance decision rendered the regulatory status final; 12(b)(1) denied. |
| Equal protection (selective enforcement / class-of-one) | Witt: Defendants selectively enforced Chapter 186 against them while neighbors were not required to seek variances; motives included FEMA pressure and lack of local ties. | Defendants: Enforcement was reasonable response to FEMA/agency pressure; plaintiffs fail to identify similarly situated comparators or show bad faith. | Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead similarly situated comparators and, for selective-enforcement, failed to allege bad-faith motive; class-of-one fails for lack of adequate comparator/timing. |
| Due process (substantive and procedural) | Witt: Stop-work order and variance conditions deprived them of property interests (permit, ability to repair, home value). | Defendants: No cognizable property interest in an erroneously issued permit or in an unconditional variance; variance was granted (with discretionary conditions). | Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs did not plead a protected property interest in the permit or a right to an unconditional variance; consequential economic harm insufficient to state due process violation. |
| Monell municipal-liability claim | Witt: Village policies/customs or failures caused constitutional violations. | Defendants: No underlying constitutional violation, so Monell cannot attach. | Court: Dismissed — Monell claim fails because all underlying constitutional claims were dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (pleading standard: court accepts factual allegations as true on motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to presumption of truth)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness and avoiding premature adjudication)
- Williamson County Reg. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (finality requirement for land-use takings/ripeness)
- Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying Williamson finality in land-use context)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection theory)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits of class-of-one in employment context)
- Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1995) (selective enforcement equal protection elements)
- Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (high degree of similarity required in class-of-one claims)
- Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (similarity inquiry central to class-of-one claims)
- Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (Monell requires an underlying constitutional violation)