Wise v. State, 242 A.3d 191

In Jan 2013 Byron Harris gave police a signed, handwritten statement and photo-array identification implicating Eric Wise in the killing of Edward Thomas.
In July 2015 Harris suffered a severe head injury in an unrelated robbery, resulting in memory loss and cognitive deficits.
At Wise’s 2017 trial Harris testified under oath but provided a different account: he said he heard shots from a bar down the street, returned to find police already outside, and could not recall writing the earlier statement (though he recognized his signature).
The State sought to admit Harris’s signed, written police statement under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) (prior inconsistent statement); the trial court admitted it and Harris read it to the jury.
Jury convicted Wise of first-degree assault and related firearm offenses (acquitted of first-degree murder); Wise appealed arguing (1) actual memory loss cannot constitute an inconsistency (relying on Corbett) and (2) the Court of Special Appeals improperly required only a “material” inconsistency.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted even if the trial contradiction arises from actual memory loss so long as the trial testimony positively and materially contradicts the prior statement; it also endorsed a materiality requirement to prevent admission based on trivial discrepancies.

Issue	Wise's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a witness's actual memory loss precludes admitting a prior written statement as a prior inconsistent statement under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a)	Corbett controls: when a witness truly cannot remember, there is no inconsistency and prior statement is inadmissible	The reason for the inconsistency is irrelevant; if trial testimony contradicts the prior statement, it qualifies under Nance/Rule 5-802.1(a)	Admitted: actual memory loss does not categorically preclude inconsistency; where the witness gives contradictory trial testimony, the prior statement may be admitted
Whether a prior inconsistent statement must contain a material inconsistency to be admissible	The Court of Special Appeals' “materiality” gloss improperly adds or weakens Nance’s requirements	Materiality is a proper floor—minor or peripheral differences should not trigger wholesale admission of a prior statement	Held: prior inconsistent statements must show a material contradiction; materiality protects Nance’s circumscribed limits and prevents admission based on trivial differences

Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993) (admitted prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence where statements are trustworthy and inconsistent with trial testimony)
Corbett v. State, 130 Md. App. 408, 746 A.2d 954 (2000) (a witness truly devoid of memory that cannot provide contradictory trial testimony may not supply the inconsistency required for admission)
Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230, 674 A.2d 944 (1996) (prior statement admissible where clearly inconsistent with trial testimony)
Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 443 A.2d 78 (1982) (failure to repeat an extrajudicial identification at trial does not destroy its probative value; loss of memory may explain non-repetition)
Makell v. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 (1995) (change in testimony governs inconsistency determination irrespective of why testimony changed)
Adams v. State, 165 Md. App. 352, 885 A.2d 833 (2005) (it is the change itself, not the reason, that triggers Nance/Rule 5-802.1(a))
McClain v. State, 425 Md. 238, 40 A.3d 396 (2012) (the cold record of conflicting statements determines inconsistency; juries weigh credibility)