Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Prosser
817 N.W.2d 830
Wis.2012Background
- Justice Prosser moved for recusal from Wisconsin Supreme Court disciplinary proceedings; the court initially found the motion premature but decided to issue a ruling.
- Rule of Necessity and the court's duty to sit are cited as requiring participation despite potential disqualifications.
- The complaint against Prosser involves two incidents: (i) alleged physical contact with Justice Bradley in her chambers; (ii) a prior remark to Chief Justice Abrahamson after a closed conference.
- Prosser sought recusal of multiple justices; Roggensack recused herself, potentially affecting quorum under Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4(1).
- The court explains it is the only tribunal authorized to determine discipline and applies the Rule of Necessity to proceed.
- The court denies Prosser’s recusal motion, finding no disqualification under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b) and (g) or SCR 60.04(4), and that it can remain impartial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule of Necessity requires the court to hear the matter despite potential disqualifications | Prosser argues disqualification bars participation | Court must sit to avoid depriving forum of dispute | Rule requires participation; court to proceed |
| Whether the chief judge’s recusal would leave the court without a quorum | Recusal could strip capacity to adjudicate | Quorum could be maintained by remaining justices | No recusal; quorum preserved so matter may proceed |
| Whether the presiding and other justices’ participation implicates disqualification under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b) and (g) or SCR 60.04(4) | Potential impartiality concerns | Must assess both subjective and objective standards; no disqualification | Court can act impartially and remain on the case |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1981) (Rule of Necessity when all judges would be disqualified)
- Pilla v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (necessity overrides disqualification in some contexts)
- Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (equal duty to sit when not disqualified; imparts impartial adjudication)
- State ex rel. Cook v. Houser, 122 Wis. 534 (1904) (historic use of Rule of Necessity in Wisconsin)
- State ex rel. Wickham v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396 (1915) (Wisconsin precedent applying necessity principles)
- Wis. Retired Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Emp. Trust Funds Bd., 207 Wis. 2d 1 (1997) (integration of necessity in adjudicative decisions)
- Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (necessity doctrine in federal appellate context)
- Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936) (necessity to prevent denying the only tribunal access to justice)
- Milburn v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 53 (1971) (presumption of impartiality in adjudication)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (presumption of honesty and integrity in adjudicators)
