Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison
2017 WI 19
| Wis. | 2017Background
- Metro Transit (a City of Madison subunit) adopted a Rule banning "weapons (pistols, rifles, knives or swords)" and other dangerous items on city buses; Metro declined to amend the Rule after 2011 Act 35 (conceding concealed-carry licenses statewide).
- Wisconsin Carry challenged enforcement of the Rule, arguing Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 (the Local Regulation Statute) precludes the City (and its subunits) from adopting or enforcing local regulation of knives/firearms that is more stringent than state law; Madison defended the Rule.
- The City argued (1) § 66.0409 applies only to ordinances/resolutions enacted by political subdivisions (cities, villages, towns, counties), not to a Commission rule; (2) as owner/operator it may exclude weapons from its buses like a private vehicle owner; and (3) the Rule is not more stringent than state law.
- The circuit court dismissed the complaint; the court of appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and reversed.
- The Supreme Court reached three legal conclusions: § 66.0409 bars municipal legislation (including actions of municipal subunits) that is more stringent than state statutes; the Commission’s rule is within that ambit because its authority flows from the City; and Wis. Stat. § 175.60 (Concealed-Carry Statute) preempts a municipal ban on concealed weapons on buses for licensees who comply with state law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 apply to the Transit & Parking Commission's rule (i.e., can a municipal subunit adopt rules regulating knives/firearms)? | § 66.0409 withdraws municipal power to regulate knives/firearms; the City and its subunits cannot enforce rules more stringent than state law. | The statute mentions only "ordinances" and "resolutions" enacted by political subdivisions (cities, etc.); a Commission "rule" is different and therefore outside § 66.0409. | The statute applies functionally to municipal legislative actions regardless of label; a municipality cannot delegate what the legislature has withdrawn, so the Commission cannot adopt rules more stringent than state law. |
| Is the Commission Rule more stringent than state law (comparison to Vehicle Statute)? | N/A (plaintiff argues Rule is preempted because more stringent). | The City argued Vehicle Statute governs vehicles generally but does not forbid municipalities from banning weapons on their buses; City ownership allows broader exclusion. | The Rule bans all firearms/knives on buses, which is more stringent than the Vehicle Statute (which allows loaded handguns in vehicles); § 66.0409 forbids local rules more stringent than state statutes, so the Rule cannot be enforced to that extent. |
| Does the Concealed-Carry Statute (§ 175.60) preempt the Rule as to licensed concealed-carry holders? | The Concealed-Carry Statute authorizes licensees to carry concealed "anywhere in this state" except statutory exceptions; municipal bans frustrate that uniform right. | The City argued "anywhere" cannot mean truly everywhere and that municipalities may restrict weapons on property they own/operate. | The Court held § 175.60 preempts local prohibitions on concealed carry in places not listed as statutory exceptions; licensed carriers in compliance with state law may not be barred from buses by the Rule. |
| Can City property/ownership justify a weapons ban on public buses (analogy to private vehicle owner)? | N/A (City argues property-rights exception). | The City claimed ownership lets it exclude weapons on its buses, analogous to a private car owner. | The Court rejected the analogy: municipal property rights are subject to statutory limits; the Local Regulation Statute and state law limit the City’s ability to exclude lawful conduct authorized by state law. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (Second Amendment protects a pre-existing individual right)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes)
- State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 271 Wis. 2d 633 (2004) (statutory interpretation principles: plain meaning, context, and purpose)
- Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (public property access and forum analysis distinct from regulatory authority)
- City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (municipalities derive powers from the state and may have powers withheld or withdrawn)