517 B.R. 900
Bankr. N.D. Ind.2014Background
- Plaintiff Martha L. Wischmeyer was appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) for defendant Steven Bobinski’s minor children by agreement and court order; state court ordered both parents to split GAL fees.
- Wischmeyer asserts Bobinski owes her $5,818.10 in GAL fees arising from post-dissolution hearings concerning the children.
- Wischmeyer filed an adversary complaint in bankruptcy court claiming the GAL fees are a "domestic support obligation" (DSO) under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) and therefore nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).
- The parties submitted a stipulated record of facts and legal issues; no live testimony or additional evidence was offered.
- The bankruptcy court addressed whether a GAL (an individual attorney appointed to represent a child) falls within § 101(14A)’s categories (owed to or recoverable by a spouse/former spouse/child’s parent/legal guardian/responsible relative or a governmental unit) and whether the fees are "in the nature of" support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether GAL fees are a "domestic support obligation" under § 101(14A)(A)(i) (owed to spouse/former spouse/parent/legal guardian/responsible relative/child) | Wischmeyer contends her GAL fees should be treated as a DSO because they arise from child-related proceedings and she functions as the child’s representative | Bobinski argues Wischmeyer is not a spouse/former spouse/parent/legal guardian/responsible relative/child and thus § 101(14A)(A)(i) does not apply | Court held GAL is not among the listed persons in § 101(14A)(A)(i); fees not a DSO under that subsection |
| Whether GAL is a "governmental unit" under § 101(14A)(A)(ii) | Wischmeyer asserts that by appointment she functions as an arm of the court and effectively a governmental actor | Bobinski contends a GAL is an individual/attorney, not a governmental unit as defined in § 101(27) | Court held GAL is not a governmental unit; § 101(27) does not encompass an individual GAL |
| Whether the GAL fees are "in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support" under § 101(14A)(B) | Wischmeyer argued the fees relate to child matters and thus are support-related | Bobinski argued the fees are compensation for legal services, not support | Court held the fees are attorney/representative fees for legal services, not obligations in the nature of support |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Kassicieh, 425 B.R. 467 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) (surveyed three lines of authority re: whether third‑party recipients of support‑type debts are covered by § 101(14A))
- In re Greco, 397 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (held persons like GALs are not within § 101(14A) categories; attorney fees not DSOs)
- Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000) (Supreme Court instructs courts to apply plain meaning of statutes when unambiguous)
- Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (reinforces presumption that statutes mean what they say; textualist canon)
- Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458 (6th Cir.) (court must apply plain meaning of Code unless literal application conflicts with congressional intent)
- Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2007) (statutory interpretation begins with the text)
Summary of holding: The court ruled that GAL fees owed to Wischmeyer are not "domestic support obligations" under § 101(14A) and therefore are dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).