Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 914 N.W.2d 1

Carlson, a long‑time Wisconsin Bell TSR with diagnosed bipolar I disorder, was suspended in 2010 after hanging up on customer calls and signed a one‑year "last chance" agreement.
On April 20, 2011, Carlson used a health call‑block code, engaged in Q‑chat messages with co‑workers while upset about failing a test, and left early; supervisors reviewed Q‑chats and concluded he had faked illness.
Wisconsin Bell terminated Carlson for violating the last‑chance agreement and for call avoidance/integrity violations.
Carlson filed WFEA claims alleging termination because of disability; ERD ALJ and LIRC found for Carlson under LIRC’s "inference method," ordering reinstatement and remedies.
Wisconsin Bell appealed; the Supreme Court reviewed whether LIRC’s inference method permits liability absent proof the employer knew the disability caused the conduct and whether record shows such knowledge at the time of termination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Carlson)	Defendant's Argument (Wis. Bell)	Held
Whether LIRC's "inference method" lawfully establishes discriminatory intent when an employee shows the conduct was caused by a disability	If disability caused the conduct and employer acted on that conduct, the action is legally "because of" the disability; employee need not prove employer knew the causal link	LIRC's method permits liability without proof employer knew disability caused conduct; that relieves plaintiff of essential proof of intent	Majority: LIRC's double‑inference is impermissible; employee must prove employer knew the disability caused the conduct at the time of the adverse action
Whether there is substantial evidence Wisconsin Bell knew, when it terminated Carlson, that his bipolar disorder caused his April 20, 2011 conduct	The employer had prior letters and Carlson’s statements linking his behavior to bipolar symptoms; inference method supports finding of knowledge	Prior medical letters did not state a causal nexus for the workplace incidents; contemporaneous evidence did not show employer's awareness of causation	Held: No substantial evidence that Wisconsin Bell knew the disability caused Carlson’s conduct at termination; therefore no WFEA violation

Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2018) (court reviews agency conclusions of law de novo but gives due weight to agency expertise)
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651 (Wis. 2003) (framework for WFEA burdens and elements)
Target Stores v. LIRC, 217 Wis. 2d 1, 576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998) (employer may justify termination under §111.34(2)(a))
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 2000) (questioning LIRC’s treatment of firing for misconduct caused by disability as per se firing because of disability)
Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 486 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2007) (protecting manifestations/symptoms of disability to avoid hollow statutory protection)
School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (recognizing necessity of protection against discrimination based on disability manifestations)