791 S.E.2d 152
S.C. Ct. App.2016Background
- In March 2009 a fire began on a flat roof connecting two Winthrop University buildings; the fire spread to adjoining pitched roofs causing extensive damage. Parties stipulated the fire originated on the flat roof.
- Winthrop hired Pickens Roofing to reroof Bancroft Hall; the contract required compliance with applicable safety laws and required owner approval for material storage locations. Winthrop approved two ground-level storage areas but not roof storage.
- Pickens workers left combustible materials (felt paper, pallets, metal pieces, copper flashing) on the flat roof the day before the fire; Pickens did not obtain permission to store materials on the roof. Experts testified the fire would have self‑extinguished on the flat roof and would not have spread to pitched roofs but for the presence of combustible materials.
- Winthrop sued for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of workmanship, and negligence. The trial was bifurcated (liability first, damages second). A jury found Pickens liable on contract and negligence claims, assessed damages of $7,223,343.14, and found Winthrop 40% comparatively negligent; Winthrop elected contract recovery.
- Pickens moved for directed verdicts/JNOV (liability and damages), for a new trial based on a challenged juror, and argued the jury should have its award reduced by comparative negligence; the trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Winthrop) | Defendant's Argument (Pickens) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Denial of juror strike for cause / motion for new trial | Juror 25 could be impartial despite prior exposure to the fire and Winthrop connections | Juror 25 had close Winthrop ties and knowledge of the fire, so should have been struck for cause; using a peremptory strike was prejudicial | Trial court did not abuse discretion; juror said she could be impartial; error (if any) not prejudicial because Pickens used a peremptory strike |
| 2. Directed verdict / JNOV on liability (causation) | Circumstantial and expert evidence showed Pickens’ roof storage caused the fire to spread — sufficient for jury | No evidence of ignition source; Winthrop relied on an improper "spread theory"; evidence only shows materials to be installed on roof are no more combustible than roof itself | Denial of directed verdict/JNOV affirmed; circumstantial and expert testimony permitted reasonable inference of causation and foreseeability |
| 3. Jury recharge on proximate cause (omission of foreseeability) | Original charge included foreseeability; brief recharge sufficed to answer jury’s question | Omitted foreseeability in recharge, prejudicing Pickens because foreseeability was the touchstone of proximate cause | No reversible error; recharge appropriately responded to jury’s limited request and original charge covered foreseeability |
| 4. Bifurcation of liability and damages phases | Liability and damages witnesses mostly distinct; bifurcation promotes economy | Causation and damages were intertwined and should be tried together to avoid unfairness | Bifurcation was within court’s discretion and appropriate because evidence overlapped minimally |
Key Cases Cited
- Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co., 288 S.C. 122 (1986) (prior relationship with party does not disqualify juror if juror can be impartial)
- Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48 (2011) (prospective jurors must be excused for cause when they cannot be fair and impartial)
- Thorburn v. Spartanburg Theatres, Inc., 263 S.C. 165 (1974) (circumstantial proof can support a jury finding of causation in fire cases when direct proof is unavailable)
- McQuillen v. Dobbs, 262 S.C. 386 (1974) (plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show facts permitting reasonable inference of causation, not mere speculation)
- Gause v. Smithers, 403 S.C. 140 (2013) (standard for reviewing JNOV/directed verdict; proximate cause is ordinarily a jury question and may be shown by circumstantial evidence)
- Ritter & Assocs., Inc. v. Buchanan Volkswagen, Inc., 405 S.C. 643 (2014) (comparative negligence doctrine applies to negligence claims but not to breach of contract recovery)