609 F.Supp.3d 578
M.D. Tenn.2022Background
- Tennessee's SORA requires registration, in-person reporting, and bars registrants from residing/working/loitering within 1,000 feet of many child-centered places; violations are felony offenses.
- Plaintiff ("Doe #11") committed a 2002 Michigan sexual offense, moved to Tennessee in 2020, was required to register in 2022, and alleges SORA’s retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
- As applied to Plaintiff, SORA's practical effects include forced nightly hotel stays (unable to sleep at home with his children), church attendance limits, and restrictions on being alone with minors.
- Plaintiff sought a TRO / preliminary injunction forbidding enforcement of SORA against him and removal/nonpublication of his registry entry; defendants opposed.
- The court analyzed which SORA provisions are retroactive, applied Seling and Mendoza–Martinez guideposts (with heavy reliance on Sixth Circuit precedent Snyder), and concluded Retroactive SORA (excluding baseline registration and the original 1997 publication baseline) is likely punitive on its face.
- The court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Retroactive SORA against Plaintiff, but denied the request to remove Plaintiff from the registry and declined to enjoin publication of his registry information; no security was required for the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which SORA provisions are retroactive to Doe's 2002 offense? | Doe: Most of SORA’s onerous reporting, residence/work, movement, and child-related restrictions postdate his offense and are retroactive as applied to him. | Lee/Rausch: Registration and publication and some restrictions are valid or not retroactive; defendants contest scope. | Court: Baseline registration and the 1997 publication baseline are not retroactive; the other SORA provisions enacted after 2002 ("Retroactive SORA") are treated as retroactive for Doe. |
| Is Retroactive SORA punitive on its face (Ex Post Facto)? | Doe: Under Mendoza–Martinez factors and Snyder, Retroactive SORA resembles parole/probation, imposes disabilities, advances punitive aims, lacks rational connection/tailoring, and is excessive — thus punitive. | Lee/Rausch: Legislature intended civil safety scheme; differences from probation/parole and five-year removal eligibility undercut punishment finding. | Court: Applying Seling and Mendoza–Martinez (guided by Snyder), found Retroactive SORA likely punitive on its face; defendant arguments (e.g., five-year removal) do not undermine facial analysis. |
| Would Doe suffer irreparable harm absent injunction? | Doe: Loss of familial interaction, forced nightly relocation, inability to attend church/family travel — constitutional injury presumed if likelihood of success. | Lee/Rausch: Injunctive relief should be tailored to specific harms; publication/registration harms not shown to be irreparable. | Court: Irreparable harm is presumed given likely constitutional violation; plaintiff's family and liberty harms demonstrated; injunction may cover Retroactive SORA broadly. |
| Public/State harm from injunction; scope of remedy (removal/publication)? | Doe: Public interest favors preventing ex post facto enforcement; limited state harm. | Lee/Rausch: Public and law enforcement rely on SOR publication and residency rules for safety; removal/publishing injunctions would harm public safety. | Court: Public interest and government harm do not outweigh constitutional protections; but because registration and the 1997 publication baseline are not retroactive, court refused to order removal or bar publication of Doe’s registry entry. |
Key Cases Cited
- Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sixth Circuit held a Michigan SORA-style scheme punitive in effect for ex post facto purposes)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (Supreme Court set framework for intent/effect test and Mendoza–Martinez guideposts for civil vs. punitive analysis)
- Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (facial nature of punitive inquiry: whether statute is punitive must be decided from the statute’s face, not solely by as-applied effects)
- Doe #1 v. Lee, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (district court analysis of SORA applying Mendoza–Martinez factors)
- Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998 (6th Cir. 2007) (ex post facto and registration-law precedent in Sixth Circuit)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Supreme Court on civil commitment vs. punitive classification)