Winston Holloway v. Benny Magness
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1961
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- GTL has a contract with ADC to provide inmate telephone service, paying ADC 45% of GTL gross revenues.
- Inmates use collect calls funded through prepaid accounts; GTL charges surcharges and per-minute fees.
- Holloway, an inmate, sued GTL and ADC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the 45% commission violates his First Amendment rights by raising costs and restricting speech.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, rejecting Holloway’s First Amendment claim.
- The contract revenues fund prison expenses, and commissions exceeded $2 million annually; GTL bears all service costs.
- On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reviews de novo, affirming the district court and declining to adopt heightened scrutiny or primary jurisdiction defenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the 45% commission burden inmate speech under First Amendment analysis? | Holloway asserts a First Amendment right to communicate and that higher costs infringe that right. | ADC’s obligation to provide service does not create a per se First Amendment right to a particular pricing level. | No First Amendment violation; commissions are part of overall service cost, not an unlawful restriction. |
| Is Turner v. Safley applicable to determine reasonableness of the cost of speech in prison? | Turner framework should apply with heightened scrutiny to the contract’s impact on speech. | Turner applies in prison speech restrictions, but the cost issue does not fit neatly into its factors. | Turner framework is not fully applicable; costs are evaluated as part of overall service provision, not as a pure speech restriction. |
| Are there adequate alternative means for inmates to communicate with outside parties? | Higher charges reduce access to outside communication, infringing rights. | Inmates have other avenues (visits, mail, GTL service) and the record shows no substantial speech restriction. | Alternatives exist; no substantial First Amendment burden shown. |
| Does no First Amendment obligation to charge a particular price foreclose Holloway’s claim? | ADC’s choice to provide service implies it cannot profit from inmate speech at high rates. | Providing service at a certain price is discretionary; profits from the service do not violate the First Amendment absent severe deprivation. | No constitutional obligation to price the service or prohibit profits; no violation shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (two Turner factors; reasonableness of regulation related to penological interests)
- Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (prison regulations reviewed for reasonable relation to penological interests)
- Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (speech rights in prison; context-dependent analysis)
- Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001) (no per se right to a particular public forum; contract context)
- Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (alternative means need only be available, not ideal)
- Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998) (prison services pricing; room and board analogy)
- Hershberger v. Scaletta, 33 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 1994) (postage for non-legal mail; cost considerations in prison services)
- Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation, 322 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (government as proprietor not immune from First Amendment constraints)