Winnie Howard v. Stephen Howard
01-14-00761-CV
| Tex. App. | Feb 12, 2015Background
- Parties married in 1979 and divorced by an agreed Decree on November 28, 1988 that divided the "estate of the parties."
- The Decree awarded each spouse "one half of any and all sums related to any vested ... retirement plan, pension plan ... existing by reason of Petitioner’s employment during the marriage."
- Stephen Howard began HPOPS service May 31, 1980; on the divorce date he had 8 years 6 months of Houston Police service and had contributed $20,765 to HPOPS (entitling him only to a return of contributions on that date).
- Post‑divorce benefits (e.g., DROP, delayed retirement, service credits) did not exist or were not vested on 11/28/1988 and were earned after the divorce.
- Trial court interpreted the Decree as unambiguous and awarded Winnie one‑half of the vested HPOPS amount existing on the date of divorce (50% of $20,765 = $10,382.50); appellant appealed, arguing the award should be valued at retirement and raised several procedural complaints about counsel’s absence and denial of a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Winnie Howard) | Defendant's Argument (Stephen Howard) | Held (trial court position defended on appeal) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the 1988 Decree is ambiguous as to valuation date for pension | Decree ambiguous; should be read to give share of pension as of retirement (includes post‑divorce accruals) | Decree unambiguous; limits award to vested benefits existing by reason of employment during the marriage (i.e., as of divorce) | Trial court: Decree unambiguous; award limited to benefits vested at divorce |
| 2. If ambiguous, whether trial court abused discretion in interpreting it | If ambiguous, interpretation should favor valuation at retirement | Trial court interpretation (supported by recitals, "vested" modifier, and "estate of the parties" language) is reasonable | Trial court: interpretation awarding only benefits existing at divorce upheld |
| 3. Whether trial court erred by starting trial before appellant’s counsel arrived | Appellant: counsel was in a conflicting court and trial should have been continued or delayed | Defendant: counsel failed to notify, failed to seek continuance or object timely; no harm shown | Trial court: no reversible error; appellant failed to preserve complaint and was not harmed |
| 4. Whether denial of new trial and inability to file findings was reversible | Appellant: unfair denial of new trial; resignation of original judge precluded filing findings | Defendant: new‑trial relief requires good cause; successor judge may enter findings under Rule 18; appellant showed no good cause or harm | Trial court: denial of new trial proper; successor judge could handle matters and appellant not prejudiced |
Key Cases Cited
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (contracts are ambiguous only if reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning; interpretation is a question of law vs. fact depending on ambiguity)
- Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003) (a decree that awards a spouse a percentage of sums "to be paid" can unambiguously grant an interest measured at retirement despite prior law)
- Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) (plain, broad decree language can include post‑divorce accruals when not limited by other decree language)
- Beshears v. Beshears, 423 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014) (when a decree frames the division as division of the marital estate, it may be read to limit awards to community property as of divorce)
- Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. 2011) ("estate of the parties" language signals division of community property only)
- Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (rules on how adjectival modifiers in series are construed)
- Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977) (apportionment formula for community interest in pensions)
- Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976) (matured and contingent retirement benefits earned during marriage are divisible community property)
- Stavinoha v. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004) (analysis of HPOPS benefits and apportionment where vesting timing differs)