Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC
881 F.3d 835
11th Cir.2018Background
- Winn-Dixie sued Big Lots, Dollar General, and Dollar Tree alleging co-located stores violated "grocery exclusive" lease covenants limiting competing grocery sales in shopping centers. 97 stores were initially identified; litigation narrowed to 54 (Alabama, Florida, Georgia).
- The district court applied Florida law across states, defined “groceries” narrowly as food (excluding prepared foods) but including some beverages, and defined “sales area” as fixture footprint only; it awarded injunctive relief for 17 Florida stores and denied damages.
- This Court (Eleventh Circuit) reversed in part, holding Florida choice‑of‑law required applying local law to non‑Florida properties and directing the district court to apply the Florida Third DCA’s 99 Cent definitions of “groceries” and “sales area” to 41 Florida stores and remand for a new trial. Winn‑Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2014).
- On remand the district court applied 99 Cent only to Florida leases executed after Feb. 20, 2002 (post‑99 Cent), and refused to apply 99 Cent retroactively to pre‑2002 leases, reasoning retroactivity/due‑process concerns; it treated Alabama and Georgia stores under their state law and found ambiguity under Alabama law.
- The Eleventh Circuit panel addressed (1) whether the district court disobeyed the prior mandate by declining to apply 99 Cent to all 41 Florida stores, (2) the proper scope of the 99 Cent definition of “groceries,” and (3) whether Alabama law renders the terms ambiguous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Winn‑Dixie) | Defendant's Argument (Big Lots/Dolgencorp) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court violated the Eleventh Circuit mandate by not applying 99 Cent definitions to all 41 Florida stores | Mandate ordered application of 99 Cent definitions to the 41 Florida stores; court must follow mandate | 99 Cent should not apply retroactively to leases executed before Feb. 20, 2002 on fairness/due process grounds | Court: District court violated mandate; must apply 99 Cent definitions to all 41 Florida stores (reverse/remand) |
| Whether 99 Cent’s definition of “groceries” should be read broadly to include many household supplies | "Groceries" includes food and many household supplies per 99 Cent; district court should follow that framework | 99 Cent is wrong or inapplicable; narrower reading or moot since Dollar Tree settled | Court: 99 Cent controls; but "household supplies" means those related to food preparation/service and kitchen cleanliness (narrower subset) |
| Whether “sales area” includes proportionate aisle space or only fixture footprint | Sales area includes fixtures and proportionate aisle space per 99 Cent; district court must adopt that | Defendants argued narrower footprint-only interpretation | Court: Sales area includes fixtures and their proportionate aisle space (agreed with 99 Cent) |
| Whether under Alabama law the terms are ambiguous and must be construed against Winn‑Dixie | Winn‑Dixie urged application of 99 Cent‑style definitions | Defendants argued ambiguity and urged narrow construction in favor of free use | Court: Affirmed district court — under Alabama law terms are ambiguous; construed narrowly against Winn‑Dixie (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Winn‑Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2014) (prior appellate decision directing application of 99 Cent definitions to Florida stores)
- 99 Cent Stuff‑Trail Plaza, LLC v. Winn‑Dixie Stores, Inc., 811 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (defined “groceries” to include food and some household supplies and held “sales area” includes fixtures and proportionate aisle space)
- Litman v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 825 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (mandate rule and law‑of‑the‑case doctrine bind district court on remand)
- Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (judicial decisions in civil cases apply retroactively as controlling interpretations of law)
- Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011) (narrow exception to law‑of‑the‑case where new, significant evidence is presented)