Wingard v. Or. Family Council, Inc., 417 P.3d 545

Plaintiff, a former state representative, previously acknowledged a consensual sexual relationship with a former 20‑year‑old legislative aide (Berrier) after allegations surfaced in 2012; he did not seek reelection then.
In 2016, plaintiff ran in a primary. Defendants mailed campaign materials stating plaintiff had "pressured" a young staffer into drinking and having sex and that he left office "in shame" or "disgrace."
Plaintiff lost the primary and sued for common‑law defamation and for violation of ORS 260.532 (prohibiting knowingly or recklessly false campaign publications).
Defendants moved to strike under Oregon’s anti‑SLAPP statute, ORS 31.150, asserting the statements were protected speech about a public issue.
The trial court found the statements were protected but denied the motion, concluding plaintiff had submitted "substantial evidence" (affidavits) to make out a prima facie case.
On appeal, the court applied the Oregon Supreme Court’s clarifying standard from Handy v. Lane County and held plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard), so the anti‑SLAPP motion should have been granted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff met ORS 31.150(3)’s burden to show a probability of prevailing (present "substantial evidence" to support a prima facie case)	Plaintiff argued his affidavits denying pressure were substantial evidence from which a jury could find defendants acted with actual malice or reckless disregard	Defendants argued statements were protected campaign speech and plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard	Held: Applying Handy, plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to infer actual malice; anti‑SLAPP motion should have been granted (reversed and remanded)

Handy v. Lane County, 360 Or. 605 (clarified that plaintiff must submit sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the plaintiff met the burden of production to survive an anti‑SLAPP motion)
Neumann v. Liles, 358 Or. 706 (elements of defamation)
Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or. 434 (public‑figure defamation requires proof of actual malice)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (constitutional actual malice standard for public‑figure plaintiffs)
Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or. App. 698 (pleadings and affidavits viewed in plaintiff’s favor at anti‑SLAPP stage)
Yes on 24‑367 Committee v. Deaton, 276 Or. App. 347 (describing anti‑SLAPP statute purpose and early dismissal mechanism)