Wing v. Dockstader, 482 F. App'x 361

Wing, appointed receiver for Vescor, filed a UFTA action to void fraudulent transfers to the Dockstaders.
District court granted summary judgment for Wing; Dockstaders appeal challenging standing, limitations, and calculations.
Southwick pled guilty to securities-fraud offenses in a Ponzi scheme; SEC suit against Southwick and Vescor preceded Wing’s appointment.
For summary judgment, the district court relied on Ponzi-scheme presumption and evidence of Vescor’s operation as a Ponzi scheme.
Dockstaders argued lack of standing, time-bar limitations, and improper methodology for calculating the judgment; they asserted discovery and tolling issues.
Court upheld the district court’s rulings on standing, Ponzi presumption application, statute of limitations with adverse domination tolling, tax offsets, and referral-fee denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing of the receiver under UFTA	Dockstaders argue receiver lacks standing to sue under UFTA.	Wing (receiver) has standing as a creditor-like claimant under Scholes.	Receiver has standing to pursue UFTA claims.
Application of the Ponzi presumption under UFTA	Evidence shows Vescor operated as a Ponzi scheme; presumption applies to all transfers.	Disputed whether Ponzi status was properly established for all transfers; notes evidentiary issues.	Court applied Ponzi presumption to all transfers; review limited by record on appeal.
Statute of limitations and discovery tolling	One-year discovery tolling and adverse domination tolling render action timely.	Transfers pre-2004/time barred; adverse domination not applicable to tolling.	Claims timely under tolling/adverse domination theory; limitations upheld.
Tax offsets against the judgment	Offsets for taxes paid should reduce the judgment.	Offsets would be inappropriate and impractical; no support.	No tax offsets allowed; judgment stands.
Referral fees and consideration of value in voidable transfers	Referral payments to Dockstaders were not voidable if for reasonably equivalent value and in good faith.	Payments were tied to aiding a Ponzi scheme and not reasonably equivalent value; good faith not established.	Dockstaders not entitled to keep referral fees; district court’s basis affirmed.

Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995) (receiver may sue as creditor-like claimant)
Donnell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (Ponzi-presumption applicability to transfers)
Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (application of Ponzi theory under state law)
Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990) (adverse domination tolling principle)
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381 (10th Cir. 1997) (alternative grounds for summary judgment)
Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007) (arguments raised in reply brief not considered)
Exum v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 389 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2004) (briefing and record adequacy standards)
Merrill v. Allen (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 60 B.R. 985 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (reference for bankruptcy-era authorities on transfers)
Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1995) (statute-of-limitations discovery standard)
Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognition of non-party beneficiary theories in fraud actions)
SASCO 1997 NI, LLC v. Zudkewich, 756 A.2d 469 (N.J. 2001) (non-binding authority for related issues)
Gulf Insurance Co. v. Clark, 20 P.3d 780 (Mont. 2001) (state law considerations in discovery)
Aaron v. Rosepink (In re Global Grounds Greenery, LLC), 405 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (bankruptcy-specific context on related issues)