Winegar v. Springville City, 319 P.3d 1

The Winegars owned wooded property adjacent to Hobble Creek; Springville City bulldozed ~100 trees in May 2005 to access/clear the creek, leaving debris, without the Winegars' consent.
The Winegars filed a notice of claim with the City on January 27, 2006; the City Clerk forwarded it to the City Attorney.
On March 20, 2006 a letter on Utah Risk Management Mutual Association (URMMA) letterhead informed the Winegars that "we must respectfully decline to make any voluntary payments on this claim." The letter was copied to the City Attorney.
The Winegars disputed that the March 20 letter constituted a lawful denial by the City or its insurer and disputed that URMMA was the City’s insurer; they later sent correspondence in April 2006 attempting to amend the claim to name employees.
The Winegars filed suit on April 24, 2007. The City moved for summary judgment arguing the complaint was untimely under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act because the claim was denied on March 20, 2006, starting the one-year filing deadline.
The district court granted summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, relying on the March 20 letter as a denial. On appeal the court vacated that grant and remanded, finding the City failed to support its denial assertion with admissible evidence and improperly introduced a crucial factual claim in a reply memorandum without giving the Winegars an opportunity to respond.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the March 20, 2006 URMMA letter constituted a lawful "denial" under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, thereby starting the one-year limitations period	The March 20 letter did not expressly deny the claim by the City or its insurer; Winegars also argued URMMA was not shown to be the City’s insurer, so the denial element was not established	The City argued the March 20 letter denied the claim (through its insurer URMMA), making the April 24, 2007 complaint untimely	Court held City failed to prove as a matter of law that the March 20 letter was a statutory denial by the City or its insurer because the City produced no admissible evidence that URMMA was its insurer or that the letter satisfied the Act’s denial requirement
Whether the district court properly considered new factual assertions (that URMMA was the City’s insurer and had denied the claim) raised for the first time in the City’s reply memorandum	Winegars argued they were deprived of procedural fairness and an opportunity to respond to the new assertions; thus summary judgment was premature	City attempted to amend its factual showing in the reply to cure the original defect	Court held the City’s attempt to add a material fact in the reply was improper without leave and prejudiced the Winegars; vacated summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings

Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 297 P.3d 578 (Utah 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment; review correctness of legal conclusions)
Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (movant must provide factual evidence showing no genuine issue of material fact)
Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 682 (Utah 2002) (strict compliance with Governmental Immunity Act is required; jurisdiction can be defeated by failure to meet statutory notice/timeliness)
Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corp., 168 P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (plaintiffs must strictly comply with Act’s requirements to sue a governmental entity)
State v. Cristobal, 288 P.3d 1096 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (distinguishing reasonable inference from speculation)
State v. Pullman, 306 P.3d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (courts may not make speculative leaps when drawing inferences on disputed facts)