Wilson v. McNeely
307 Ga. App. 876
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- In 2000, Wilson was represented by McNeely in purchasing Emanuel County real property and later sued McNeely for legal malpractice.
- On the eve of trial, Wilson identified a non-attorney witness, Rodney Wilson, as an expert on the standard of care in real estate closings.
- McNeely moved in limine to exclude Rodney’s testimony, arguing he was not an qualified expert since he did not practice law at the relevant time.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the in limine motion, then Wilson’s claim proceeded without an adequate expert to establish the standard of care, leading to a directed verdict for McNeely.
- Wilson, proceeding pro se, appealed challenging the ruling on Rodney’s qualifications and related trial conduct questions.
- The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Rodney was not engaged in practicing law at the relevant time and thus not qualified under OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rodney Wilson qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c)(1). | Wilson asserts Rodney was practicing law at the relevant time. | McNeely contends Rodney did not practice or teach law at the relevant time. | Rodney was not practicing law; trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding him. |
| Whether applying OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c)(2) (medical malpractice standard) to legal malpractice was error. | Wilson argues the medical-malpractice standard analogies do not govern legal malpractice. | McNeely argues the analogy was permissible and the result reasonable. | Trial court’s analogy was not reversible error; division 1 controls. |
| Whether the pro se status affected the court’s evidentiary rulings or fairness of proceedings. | Wilson argues deference to pro se status should relax procedural demands. | McNeely contends standard procedural rules apply to all litigants. | Court did not abuse its discretion; pro se status does not excuse procedural defaults. |
Key Cases Cited
- Craigo v. Azizi, 301 Ga.App. 181, 687 S.E.2d 198 (2009) (expert qualification for professional malpractice)
- HNTB Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287 Ga. 641, 697 S.E.2d 770 (2010) (legal standard for admissibility of expert testimony)
- Moran v. Kia Motors America, 276 Ga.App. 96, 622 S.E.2d 439 (2005) (analysis of expert qualification)
- McGuire Holdings v. TSQ Partners, 290 Ga.App. 595, 660 S.E.2d 397 (2008) (trial court discretion on expert testimony)
- Smith v. Liberty Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, 285 Ga. App. 606, 647 S.E.2d 315 (2007) (expert qualification in professional malpractice)
- In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E.2d 741 (2003) (attorney closings and licensing requirements)
- AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353(1), 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994) (reference on professional standards)
- Riley v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 295 Ga.App. 656, 657, 673 S.E.2d 49 (2009) (pro se deference and evidentiary rules)