Wilson v. Cox, 828 F. Supp. 2d 20

Wilson, a pro se plaintiff, was a security guard and resident at AFRH-Washington and his status shifted from competitive service to excepted service upon moving into the Home in December 2002.
Wilson signed a letter in December 2002 indicating he resigned from civil service; lawsuit alleges this transition was involuntary due to lack of information about consequences.
In 2003, the Home abolished the resident employee program and replaced it with a stipend/non-payroll arrangement, resulting in Wilson’s January 4, 2004 last day of work as a resident guard.
Wilson alleged the program’s dissolution was motivated by age-based discrimination, and he pursued EEO, MSPB, and then filed suit in federal court while those proceedings were ongoing.
Defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment; Wilson moved to amend his complaint, which the court denied.
The court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims, dismissing Rehabilitation Act and ADEA claims, and denying leave to amend; reasons included lack of protected disability, absence of adverse action from the first change in status, and failure to show discriminatory pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Rehabilitation Act viability	Wilson alleges disability-based discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.	Rehabilitation Act claim is inadequately argued and lacks a cognizable disability allegation.	Rehabilitation Act claim is dismissed.
ADEA claim based on status change from competitive to excepted service	Conversion to excepted status constitutes age-based discrimination.	Transition was voluntary and not an adverse action; no discrimination shown.	No adverse action; ADEA claim fails.
ADEA claim based on termination from resident program	Termination and stipend program discrimination against older employees.	Termination was a legitimate cost/operational decision with non-discriminatory rationale.	Defendants' proffered reasons not shown to be pretext; summary judgment for defendants on ADEA claim.
New Due Process and Promissory Estoppel claims	Due process and promissory estoppel entitlements arose from Home actions.	Claims were not properly pled and lack standing or definite promises.	Claims dismissed; amendment futile.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. Supreme Court 2007) (pleading must state plausible claims, not mere conclusory allegations)
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (U.S. Supreme Court 2009) (rejects bare assertions and requires plausible factual enhancement)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. Supreme Court 1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (prima facie elements and inference framework for discrimination)
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (employer’s reason may be pretext if discriminatory motive shown)
Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (honest belief in non-discriminatory reasons defeats pretext claim)
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (U.S. Supreme Court 1993) (age-based discrimination; context of evaluating action at issue)
Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (courts defer to government’s business decisions in nondiscriminatory actions)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (U.S. Supreme Court 1975) (standing requirements for federal court action)
Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emotionally charged policy claims grounded in entitlement need concrete basis)