Wilson Peguero Mateo v. Attorney General United States
870 F.3d 228
3rd Cir.2017Background
- Mateo, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty (2013) to conspiracy to commit Robbery of a Motor Vehicle under Pennsylvania law and was sentenced to incarceration and probation.
- DHS charged him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) because robbery of a motor vehicle is a "crime of violence" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), which incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16.
- Section 16(b) defines a crime of violence as any felony that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used"—a residual-style clause analyzed via the categorical approach.
- The IJ and BIA held Mateo removable on the ground his conspiracy conviction constituted an aggravated felony as a crime of violence; Mateo petitioned for review in the Third Circuit.
- After supplemental briefing prompted by Dimaya and in light of the Third Circuit’s binding decision in Baptiste, the court held § 16(b), as incorporated into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague and vacated the removal order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether vagueness doctrine applies in immigration context | Mateo: Due process requires vagueness review because deportation is severe | Government: Vagueness doctrine should not apply the same way in civil immigration proceedings | Court: Vagueness doctrine applies in immigration; deportation’s gravity warrants full due process protections |
| Whether § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson | Mateo: § 16(b) is like ACCA residual clause and is vague under Johnson | Government: § 16(b) differs and should survive vagueness challenge | Court: § 16(b) is void for vagueness as applied in immigration, following Baptiste |
| Whether Robbery of a Motor Vehicle qualifies as a § 16(b) crime of violence | Mateo: Statute is overbroad; his conspiracy conviction doesn’t categorically qualify | Government: Robbery of a Motor Vehicle involves the requisite substantial risk of force | Court: Did not need to resolve because § 16(b) is invalid; removal vacated |
| Precedential effect of Baptiste on this case | Mateo: Relied on Baptiste to argue § 16(b) invalid | Government: Cited contrary circuit decisions (e.g., Fifth Circuit) | Court: Bound by Baptiste; followed other circuits holding § 16(b) void in immigration context |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Baptiste v. Attorney General, 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2016) (held 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into INA, is unconstitutionally vague)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (held § 16(b) void for vagueness; certiorari granted)
- Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to civil immigration actions)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (deportation is a severe consequence integral to criminal penalties; accurate advice on immigration consequences is critical)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (stressed need for predictability in immigration consequences of guilty pleas)