Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami
208 So. 3d 1271
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Harriette Wilson‑Greene slipped and fell in May 2008 in the lobby elevator hallway of Miami Riverside Center, landing in a green substance later described in the incident report as "soup."
- She had arrived earlier, rode the elevator to the second floor, spent over 15 minutes, and then returned; she did not observe any substance before entering the elevator.
- The City of Miami owns the building; Vista Maintenance Services had a maintenance contract requiring attention to the lobby area and daily policing/rearrangement of furniture.
- Vista and the City moved for summary judgment arguing no duty to constantly patrol and no actual or constructive notice of the spilled substance.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Vista and the City; the appeal challenges that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Vista owed a contractual or heightened duty to continuously patrol the lobby | Contract language requiring close attention to the lobby and daily policing imposes a duty of reasonable care (effectively constant patrol) | Contract language does not create a duty to constantly patrol or a heightened standard beyond ordinary care | Court: Contract language insufficient to impose constant‑patrol or heightened duty; no duty to that extent |
| Whether defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition | Presence of cooled ("not hot") soup allows inference it had been on the floor long enough for defendants to have constructive notice | No one observed the spill; absent evidence of time on floor, no actual or constructive notice | Court: No actual notice; constructive notice not established because it would require impermissible stacking of inferences |
| Whether circumstantial evidence (cooled soup) is enough to send case to jury | Cooled soup permits inference it had been on floor long enough for notice (relying on melting‑substance precedents) | Cooled soup alone does not prove it was hot when spilled or present long enough; requires stacking inferences | Court: Distinguishes melting‑substance cases; here jury would have to stack inferences, so summary judgment appropriate |
| Whether summary judgment standard was applied correctly | N/A (plaintiff contends genuine issues exist) | Summary judgment is appropriate because no material fact issue on duty or notice | Court: Reviewed de novo and affirmed summary judgment for defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)
- Bartsch v. Costello, 170 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (elements of negligence)
- Storr v. Proctor, 490 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (landowner duty to business invitees)
- Maryland Maint. Serv., Inc. v. Palmieri, 559 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (constructive notice and contractual liability principles)
- Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Pierce Goodwin Alexander & Linville, 137 So. 3d 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (heightened contractual standard of care applies only where contract expressly imposes it)
- CH2M Hill Se., Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 698 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (contractual duties that exceed ordinary care create enforceable heightened standards)
- Cohen v. Arvin, 878 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (prohibition on impermissible stacking of inferences)
- Gelco Convention Servs. v. Pettengill, 710 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (limits on drawing chained inferences from circumstantial evidence)
- Dominguez v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 187 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (consideration of time a condition existed in transitory foreign substance cases)
- Teate v. Winn‑Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (melting‑substance precedent where jury could draw a single inference from water present around peas)
- Camina v. Parliament Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (thawed ice cream allowed jury inference that condition pre‑existed)
- Grizzard v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 330 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (partially frozen, partially liquefied substance supported jury inference)