Wilmington v. Lubbers
2014 Ohio 3083
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- On Dec. 1, 2012, Officer Neil Rager observed Raymond Lubbers driving slowly (25 then 20 mph) in higher-speed zones and follow him into a Taco Bell parking lot where Lubbers attempted a U-turn and struck a curb; Rager then initiated a traffic stop.
- Rager had encountered Lubbers ten days earlier when Lubbers was found intoxicated and passed out in his vehicle outside a bar; Rager knew Lubbers stayed at a nearby Holiday Inn.
- Rager cited Lubbers for impeding traffic by driving unreasonably slowly (Wilmington Ord. 333.04(a)) and for OVI; citation noted a breath test result of .13 BAC.
- Lubbers moved to suppress, arguing the stop lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion and thus violated the Fourth Amendment; a hearing was held where Rager testified to his observations and prior contact with Lubbers.
- The trial court dismissed the slow-speed charge but denied suppression of the OVI evidence, finding the stop justified by the totality of circumstances (time of night, prior encounter, missed turn, curbing during U-turn).
- Lubbers pleaded no contest to OVI, was sentenced (suspended pending a program), and appealed, arguing the stop was unlawful.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City/Wilmington) | Defendant's Argument (Lubbers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the traffic stop was lawful | Officer had probable cause/ reasonable suspicion to stop for impeding traffic by driving unreasonably slow given observed speeds and conduct | No reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause; slow speed alone at night in light traffic is insufficient; speed may be explained by searching for motel entrance | Stop was lawful: officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation (unreasonably slow/impeding traffic) occurred |
| Whether dismissal of the slow-speed charge negates the stop | City: dismissal of ordinance charge does not erase the officer's probable cause at the time of stop | Lubbers: dismissal shows no violation occurred, so stop was improper | Court: dismissal is irrelevant; test is whether officer had probable cause at the moment of stop |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (a motor-vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred makes a vehicle stop reasonable even if officer had ulterior motives)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause requires a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not certainty)
- Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996) (Ohio recognizes that observing a traffic violation supplies probable cause for a stop)