Wilmington Trust Company v. Karen Anne Sullivan-Thorne
2013 ME 94
| Me. | 2013Background
- Sullivan-Thorne owned property in Mechanic Falls and executed a 2006 note for $107,600 to IndyMac, secured by a mortgage in favor of IndyMac.
- In 2009-2010, mold damage occurred; Cambridge Mutual Insurance sued Sullivan-Thorne in Superior Court (Cambridge Action) for related damages.
- IndyMac asserted in Cambridge Action that insurance proceeds should be payable to IndyMac due to Sullivan-Thorne’s breach of the note and mortgage terms.
- IndyMac sent a May 2010 default notice; IndyMac later counterclaimed in September 2010 alleging breach of the note/mortgage and related failures to protect/repair/insure property.
- Cambridge Action resulted in a final judgment (March 24, 2011) directing insurance proceeds to be paid to Sullivan-Thorne alone.
- In October 2011 Wilmington filed a foreclosure action; Sullivan-Thorne moved for summary judgment arguing res judicata-based dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars Wilmington's foreclosure action. | Wilmington argues Cambridge Action precludes this claim. | Sullivan-Thorne contends the Cambridge Action did not adjudicate Wilmington's foreclosure claim. | Not barred; issues not litigated in Cambridge. |
| Whether IndyMac could have pursued foreclosure in the Cambridge Action. | Foreclosure relief could have been sought via counterclaim. | Foreclosure claims must be brought by complaint, not counterclaim. | IndyMac could not have brought foreclosure counterclaim; foreclosure must be by complaint. |
| Whether the Cambridge Action involved the same cause of action as Wilmington's foreclosure action. | Both actions arise from breach of the same mortgage. | Cambridge Action concerned failure to protect/repair/insure, not failure to make payments. | Different causes of action; not the same transactional facts. |
| Whether the alleged failure to make payments (the nucleus of operative facts) was litigated in the Cambridge Action. | Payment default was part of IndyMac's claim in Cambridge. | Nucleus facts of nonpayment were not litigated in Cambridge. | Not litigated; supports reversal of summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642 (Me. 1982) (foundation of res judicata principles)
- Guardianship of Jewel M., 2 A.3d 301 (Me. 2010) (claim preclusion framework)
- Kaleb D. In re Kaleb D., 769 A.2d 179 (Me. 2001) (transactional approach to causes of action)
- Sebra v. Wentworth, 990 A.2d 538 (Me. 2010) (transactional test for grouping facts)
- KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Sargent, 758 A.2d 528 (Me. 2000) (definition of transactional cause-of-action grouping)
- Sargent (Johnson v. Samson Construction Corp.), 704 A.2d 866 (Me. 1997) (foreclosure action mechanics and acceleration discussion)
- Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708 (Me. 1993) (foreclosure/potential counterclaim interaction)
- Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 956 A.2d 110 (Me. 2008) (compulsory counterclaims and res judicata analogue)