Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust A v. Hunters Glen Municipal Utility District and Aldine Independent School District
14-20-00277-CV
| Tex. App. | May 12, 2022Background
- In 2005 Johnson granted a deed of trust to CitiFinancial; the deed was assigned to CitiFinancial Servicing, LLC in 2013 and to Wilmington in 2017.
- Hunters Glen MUD sued in rem in May 2016 for delinquent ad valorem taxes, joining Aldine ISD; CitiFinancial Servicing was named and served but did not appear, and a default tax-foreclosure judgment was signed June 17, 2017.
- The Johnson property was sold at a tax sale in December 2017 to Dennis Bruyere; a deed was recorded in January 2018 and $38,925.08 from the sale satisfied the tax judgment.
- Wilmington (as successor to the deed of trust) deposited the sale funds in the clerk’s registry and filed a bill of review in January 2019, arguing the tax judgment is void as to the deed of trust because service on CitiFinancial Servicing did not strictly comply with Texas service rules.
- The trial court denied Wilmington’s summary-judgment motion and granted Appellees’ joint motion for summary judgment on January 10, 2020; Wilmington appealed.
- On appeal the court found the record showed Dennis Bruyere remained an active defendant and the trial court had not disposed of all parties/claims, so there was no final, appealable judgment; the appeal was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the citation/ service on CitiFinancial Servicing strictly complied with Texas rules (so the tax judgment is void as to the deed of trust) | Citation was defective under rules 117a(4),(6) and 107(b)(2),(8); service did not strictly comply, so judgment void as to the deed of trust | Service and return were sufficient; the trial court acquired jurisdiction and judgment stands | Trial court granted Appellees’ summary judgment (implicitly upholding service); the appellate court did not resolve the service question on the merits because it dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment |
| Whether the trial-court orders are final and appealable | Wilmington treated the January 10, 2020 orders as appealable | Appellees maintained the orders disposed of Wilmington’s claims against them and were appealable; Bruyere remained a party | Appellate court held the record showed Bruyere remained an active defendant and the trial court had not disposed of all parties/claims; orders were not final |
| Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the summary-judgment orders | Wilmington proceeded with appeal | Appellees argued jurisdiction exists if the judgment is final | Appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review nonfinal orders and dismissed the appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. 2004) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be presumed or waived)
- M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2004) (appellate courts must review jurisdiction sua sponte)
- Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000) (appeals generally lie only from final judgments)
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (a judgment is final only if it disposes of every pending claim and party or clearly states finality)
- Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. 2012) (Texas appellate jurisdiction limited to final judgments)
- Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (jurisdictional doctrines regarding finality and subject matter jurisdiction)