Willowmere Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hous.
2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 1105
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Two homeowners associations (Willowmere and Nottingham) sued to challenge a City rezoning that allowed CMHP to build multifamily housing; the appeal concerns only standing.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and that both associations lacked standing because their boards did not follow bylaws when authorizing suit.
- Willowmere's board claimed authorization via an email chain; the emails were not in the record and the bylaws required signed written consent and a posted explanation, so Willowmere failed to prove compliance.
- Nottingham's president testified there was no formal board meeting, no written consents or minutes, and discussions were informal phone calls without notice; the bylaws require meetings or unanimous written consent and memorialization.
- The trial court treated the bylaw violations as fatal to standing and dismissed; plaintiffs appealed arguing defendants lacked standing to raise the bylaw defects, that they did comply, or that any bylaw violations were non‑jurisdictional technicalities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant or court could raise standing after initial filings | Defendants lack contractual/statutory standing to challenge associations' internal bylaw compliance | Standing implicates jurisdiction and may be raised by parties or the court at any time | Court: jurisdiction/standing can be inquired into sua sponte; it was proper to consider standing |
| Whether Willowmere complied with bylaws when authorizing suit | Willowmere: board unanimously authorized suit by an email consent chain | Opponents: emails not in record; bylaws require signed written consent and posting; no authorization under statute shown | Court: Willowmere failed to prove compliant written consent or posting; no standing |
| Whether Nottingham complied with bylaws when authorizing suit | Nottingham: authorization occurred via telephone consultations among directors; teleconference meetings are permitted | Opponents: no notice, no quorum meeting, no minutes or written consents as bylaws require | Court: phone discussions without notice or memorialization did not satisfy bylaws; no standing |
| Whether bylaw noncompliance is merely procedural (non‑jurisdictional) | Plaintiffs: bylaw provisions are procedural technicalities and do not defeat court jurisdiction | Defendants: lack of proper board authorization defeats the association's capacity to invoke court (standing) | Court: bylaw noncompliance deprived associations of standing to sue; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Marriott v. Chatham Cty., 187 N.C. App. 491, 654 S.E.2d 13 (party invoking jurisdiction bears burden; review de novo) (2007)
- Reece v. Forga, 138 N.C. App. 703, 531 S.E.2d 881 (court may dismiss sua sponte for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction) (2000)
- Laurel Park Villas Homeowners Assoc. v. Hodges, 82 N.C. App. 141, 345 S.E.2d 464 (bylaw/noncompliance can defeat association's standing) (1986)
- Beech Mountain Property Owners' Assoc. v. Current, 35 N.C. App. 135, 240 S.E.2d 503 (corporation distinct from members; capacity to sue depends on governing documents) (1978)
- Mosler v. Druid Hills Land Co., 199 N.C. App. 293, 681 S.E.2d 456 (subject‑matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by parties' consent) (2009)