Willis v. State
304 Ga. 686
Ga.2018Background
- Defendant Demetrius G. Willis was tried for three malice murders (wife Talisa Hankins, father Jerry Williams, Jr., and child Jerry Williams III), multiple related offenses, and the State sought the death penalty; jury recommended death for the murder counts and the trial court imposed death sentences.
- Facts: Willis allegedly entered the victims’ home early June 28, 2004, shot multiple occupants; three children survived with injuries; physical evidence (blood on clothing and shoes in the car trunk, ballistics consistent with a nine millimeter Astra) linked Willis to the scene; the murder weapon was not recovered.
- Procedural history: indictment July 16, 2004; jury selection May–June 2008; guilty verdicts in July 2008; death sentences imposed July 2008; motion for new trial denied; appeal to Georgia Supreme Court.
- The Court found the evidence sufficient to support convictions and death sentences, but concluded three aggravated-assault convictions (as to the murder victims) merged into the malice murder convictions and therefore vacated those assault convictions/sentences.
- The Court considered multiple pretrial, voir dire, jury-selection, evidentiary, and sentencing-phase claims, and affirmed the convictions and death sentences except as to the merged aggravated-assault counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Willis) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for convictions and death sentences | Evidence insufficient to prove guilt/burden for aggravators | Evidence (eyewitness ID, confessions to companions, blood/DNA, ballistics) supports guilt and aggravators | Evidence sufficient; convictions and death sentences upheld |
| Merger of aggravated assault with malice murder | Aggravated-assault convictions based on same shootings should merge into murder | Assaults were separate acts supporting separate convictions | Court vacated three aggravated-assault convictions as they merged into malice murder (no separate independent assaults proven) |
| Jury voir dire: excusal for cause based on death penalty views | Several jurors should not have been excused/others should have been excused; trial-court voir dire defective | Trial court properly assessed whether views would prevent/substantially impair juror duties | Court found no abuse of discretion in excusals; adopted new rule: erroneous denial to excuse for cause is harmless if juror did not serve on the 12-person jury (overruled Harris/Fortson) |
| Harmlessness when defendant uses peremptory to remove challenged juror | Using peremptory to remove a juror wrongly retained for cause is per se harmful | If defendant uses a peremptory to remove the juror and juror does not serve, no constitutional deprivation | Court overruled prior presumption of per se harm (Harris/Fortson); held defendant must show an unqualified juror actually served on the 12-person jury to obtain reversal |
| Limitation of voir dire regarding child-victim questions | Trial court improperly limited questions about impact of child victims on sentencing-reasoning | Court permitted properly framed general questions and disallowed prejudging or repetitive specifics | No reversible error: allowed general inquiry about whether child victim would preclude consideration of sentences; disallowed impermissible commitment questions |
| Admission of victim-impact testimony | Testimony was overly inflammatory and violated statutory/constitutional limits | Trial court redacted improper language and allowed brief victim-impact statements; any improper statements harmless | Brief victim-impact testimony largely permissible; one improper comment (“we are expecting justice”) found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Gang-affiliation evidence and booking statement | Gang evidence and booking-question answer violated First Amendment/Dawson or Miranda protections | Gang affiliation and testimony about arrest/intake were relevant to character/aggravation and admissible; booking question treated as routine | No reversible error; gang evidence relevant to character; limited booking-question testimony admissible and not plainly erroneous |
| Method-of-execution and death-penalty-statute challenges | Statutes/methods unconstitutional (various Eighth/Fourteenth/Separation-of-powers/definition arguments) | Claims improper for direct appeal in this proceeding or previously rejected; execution-method suits belong in appropriate suit against state officers | Claims rejected: statutory challenges meritless or not preserved; method-of-execution challenge not the proper vehicle on direct appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (evidence-sufficiency standard) (establishes rational-trier-of-fact standard)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (capital sentencing principle that aggravating factors must be found beyond reasonable doubt)
- Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (erroneous exclusion of juror for death-penalty views may mandate reversal)
- United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (peremptory strikes are not constitutional rights and using one to cure judge error can render error harmless)
- Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (First Amendment limits on admitting gang/associational evidence at sentencing)
- Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (booking-question and Miranda analysis)
- Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63 (standard for disqualifying juror for death-penalty views)
- Fortson v. State, 277 Ga. 164 (overruled in part) (earlier presumption of per se harm when defendant forced to use peremptory on juror who should have been excused)
- Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (overruled) (prior rule treating error harmlessness and panel of qualified jurors)
- Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (merger and separate-assault analysis) (explains when multiple wounds can support separate aggravated-assault convictions)