Willis v. Mullins, 1:04-cv-06542

Background

On March 27, 1996, police (Officers Mullins, Silvius, Deputy Hood) and Parole Agent Diane Mora went to an E-Z 8 Motel to conduct a parole search of Gary Willis based on a parole roster listing. Willis had in fact been discharged from parole nine months earlier and later produced a parole discharge card.
Mora reviewed the parole roster entry and told Mullins she believed Willis was on active parole; she then left to verify his status by phone while Mullins detained Willis outside the room.
While Mora was away, Silvius spoke with Kathleen Moye (the other occupant), who admitted recent methamphetamine use and said she put a speed pipe in Willis’s briefcase; Silvius asked and obtained Moye’s consent to search the briefcase, then opened it and found drugs and paraphernalia.
Mora was not present when Moye was questioned or when the briefcase was opened; she either was in her car or the motel office checking Willis’s status and later learned Willis had been discharged.
Willis’s criminal conviction based on the search was ultimately overturned by the California Supreme Court; Willis then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Summary adjudication left only the claim that the briefcase search (based on Moye’s consent) violated Willis’s Fourth Amendment rights. Mora moved for summary judgment on that remaining claim.
The court granted Mora’s summary judgment motion, holding she neither set in motion nor was an integral participant in a search she could reasonably foresee would be unconstitutional; no supervisor or integral-participant liability attached as a matter of law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mora can be liable under § 1983 for the briefcase search by "setting in motion" events that led to the unconstitutional search	Mora supervised/authorized the parole search and, after Willis produced a discharge card, should have stopped the operation; leaving the scene amounted to setting in motion events she reasonably should have foreseen	Mora left only to verify parole status, did not direct or participate in the briefcase search, and could not reasonably foresee Moye’s statements or the subsequent nonconsensual search	Mora not liable; summary judgment granted — supervisor "setting in motion" liability not established
Whether Mora is liable as an "integral participant" in the briefcase search	As the supervising parole officer who authorized and led the operation, Mora was fundamentally involved and thus an integral participant even if not physically present	Mora was not present when Moye was questioned or when briefcase was opened, had no awareness of or reason to know of a plan to search the briefcase	Mora not an integral participant; no evidence she had reason to know of or acquiesced in the plan to search
Whether prior Ninth Circuit rulings preclude summary judgment for Mora (law-of-the-case)	Ninth Circuit previously found factual questions about reasonableness of Mora’s belief she had authority to search, allegedly precluding summary judgment now	Ninth Circuit’s earlier commentary concerned Mora’s reasonableness regarding entry/parole status, not the separate issue of briefcase-search liability	Law of the case did not preclude summary judgment on the briefcase-search claim
Whether an intervening independent action by other officers breaks causation for supervisor liability	(implicit) Mora’s failure to stop others makes their actions foreseeable and thus her responsibility	The search and consent by Moye were independent, unforeseen events that break proximate causation; holding a supervisor liable on that basis would amount to respondeat superior	Independent intervening acts (Moye’s admission and consent; Silvius’s ensuing search) broke the causal chain; Mora not liable

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.) (supervisor liability where actor sets in motion acts that cause constitutional deprivation)
Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991) (supervisor liability by ratification where chief condoned and declined to discipline unconstitutional conduct)
Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (integral-participant doctrine requires fundamental involvement or affirmative support)
Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing bystanders from officers who directly participate or lead unconstitutional conduct)
Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2008) (no supervisor liability where officer in charge was not present, did not instruct others to act, and did not approve the arrest)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden-shifting framework)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)