Willie Owens III v. State, 12-13-00386-CR

Willie Owens III was convicted of five counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine based on five controlled buys in May–July 2012 using a confidential informant (CI).
The CI arranged each buy by calling the same phone number, was searched and fitted with audio/video recording equipment, given money, and returned with recorded videos and the purchased cocaine each time.
Police officers who supervised the operations observed the calls and monitored the recordings; the trial court viewed the audio/video evidence.
Ownership/connection evidence: one buy occurred in a vehicle registered to Owens; three buys occurred at a residence linked to Owens by a water bill; Owens’s driver’s license photo matched the seller in the videos.
DPS lab reports confirmed the substances were cocaine; the CI and officers testified the CI had been paid for past work but could not recall exact amounts; the CI file was produced at the motion for new trial hearing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CI testimony was sufficiently corroborated under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.141	The State argued independent evidence (videos, phone number, vehicle registration, residence link, lab reports, ID photo) tended to connect Owens to the offenses	Owens argued the CI was the only direct non-officer witness and lacked independent corroboration tying Owens to the sales	Affirmed: corroboration excluding CI testimony was sufficient to tend to connect Owens to the offenses
Sufficiency of the evidence to support convictions	The State argued recordings, CI testimony, lab reports, and corroborating links established knowing possession with intent to deliver	Owens argued the totality of evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt	Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether the State suppressed exculpatory/impeachment/mitigating evidence (CI file/amounts paid) under Brady/Art. 39.14	The State argued it did not withhold material evidence; CI payments were acknowledged at trial and CI file was produced at the new-trial hearing	Owens argued nondisclosure of the CI’s cooperation agreement and exact payments deprived him of impeachment material and possibly affected outcome	Affirmed: disclosure of exact payment amounts would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result; no Brady/Art. 39.14 violation

Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (corroboration requirement for confidential informant testimony and standard for reviewing such corroboration)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal-sufficiency standard — view evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (standard of review for sufficiency challenges)
Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (elements for proving possession of a controlled substance)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for undisclosed evidence)
Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (impeachment evidence is Brady material)
Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (on disclosure of informant-related evidence and impeachment value)
Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (assessing materiality by balancing exculpatory evidence against strength of conviction evidence)
Michaelwicz v. State, 186 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) (elements a defendant must show to prevail on nondisclosure claim)