73 F.4th 545
7th Cir.2023Background
- Plaintiff Willie Balle, an Illinois inmate, was ordered to carry five-gallon buckets of near‑boiling water ~35–40 feet across a wet, damaged kitchen floor; he tripped in a hole, fell, and suffered second‑ and third‑degree burns with permanent scarring and nerve damage.
- The kitchen floor was structurally damaged and slippery; the hot‑water system malfunctioned intermittently.
- Defendants: Susie Hobart (kitchen supervisor; present in kitchen on the injury date), Daniel Hobart (dietary manager; knew of floor damage and that inmates sometimes carried heated water), and David Kennedy (chief engineer; knew of floor problems and periodic hot‑water failures but denied knowledge that inmates carried scalding water).
- District court screened and dismissed claims against Susie, Teri (warden), and Harbarger; it granted summary judgment for Daniel and David for lack of subjective knowledge; it denied plaintiff’s multiple motions to recruit counsel.
- Seventh Circuit: affirms summary judgment for Daniel and David (no evidence they knew inmates were carrying scalding water); reverses the dismissal of the claim against Susie (pleaded facts plausibly allege she was aware and required the practice); affirms dismissal of Teri/Harbarger and denial of appointed counsel; remands for further proceedings against Susie.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether carrying near‑boiling water across a wet, potholed kitchen floor posed an Eighth Amendment objectively substantial risk | Balle: the combination (hot water + damaged slippery floor + hands full) created an excessive risk of serious harm | Defs: a slippery or damaged surface alone is not an Eighth Amendment violation | Holding: The combination could be objectively serious; triable issue exists as to objective risk when scalding water was carried over the floor |
| Whether Daniel (dietary manager) was deliberately indifferent (subjective knowledge) | Balle: Daniel knew inmates heated/carried water and knew floor was hazardous; jury could infer he knew water was dangerously hot | Daniel: testified he did not know the water exceeded safe temps and did not recall seeing inmates carry hot water | Holding: Affirmed summary judgment for Daniel — record lacked sufficient evidence that he actually knew the water was scalding |
| Whether David (chief engineer) was deliberately indifferent (subjective knowledge) | Balle: David knew floor problems and hot‑water failures, so he must have known inmates were exposed to the risk | David: denied knowledge that inmates were instructed to carry scalding water; no evidence he was exposed to that info | Holding: Affirmed summary judgment for David — no admissible evidence he was aware inmates carried scalding water |
| Whether dismissal at screening of Susie (and of Teri/Harbarger without leave to amend) and denial of counsel were proper | Balle: pleaded Susie was present and required the practice; dismissal was improper; also sought appointed counsel | Defs/District Ct: complaint didn’t show Susie could fix the sink; plaintiff failed to document reasonable efforts to obtain counsel | Holding: Reversed dismissal re Susie (pleading plausible claim); affirmed dismissal of Teri/Harbarger (no abuse of discretion in failing to grant leave to amend); affirmed denial of counsel (plaintiff failed Pruitt step‑one documentation) |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate‑indifference standard: objective risk + subjective awareness).
- Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2016) (dangers exceeding ordinary slip‑and‑fall can support Eighth Amendment claim).
- Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014) (slippery surfaces or shower floors alone, without more, typically do not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
- Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2020) (inference of official knowledge may be drawn from obvious or longstanding risk, but official must have been exposed to information about the risk).
- Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2016) (reversing summary judgment where record supported inference that officials knew of environmental dangers).
- Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2017) (insufficient evidence of obvious risk cannot support a finding of subjective knowledge).