Williams v. Williams, 2021 ND 134

Parties divorced after ~1 year of marriage and share two minor children; initial divorce judgment entered Feb 2018, amended Jan 2020.
In mid-2020 both parties filed cross-motions (contempt and to amend the judgment); district court held an evidentiary hearing Nov 2, 2020 and issued bench rulings.
Court amended parenting-time provisions to reduce exchanges and create a more structured schedule, terminated the parenting coordinator, and deleted a right-of-first-refusal overnight provision.
Record included testimony from an occupational therapist and a letter of medical necessity indicating one child has separation anxiety and difficulty with transitions; counseling was recommended.
Jennifer Williams appealed, arguing (1) the court failed to make required findings for modifying parenting time, (2) the parenting coordinator was terminated without lawful "good cause," and (3) deletion of the right-of-first-refusal violated due process.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the second amended judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the court err by modifying parenting time without explicit findings of material change and best interests?	Williams: court did not make explicit findings of material change or best interests; remand needed.	Williams (defendant/appellee) implicitly argued the record supports modification and the court explained its rationale.	Affirmed — court's bench comments and record permit inference of material change (exchange problems, child’s transition issues) and best-interests determination; no abuse of discretion.
Was termination of the parenting coordinator unlawful without "good cause"?	Williams: N.D.C.C. § 14-09.2-08 requires "good cause" whenever a parenting coordinator is terminated.	Aron: statutory "good cause" applies only when court terminates on its own motion; other listed grounds permit termination without that label.	Affirmed — statute requires a specific good-cause finding only when the court terminates on its own motion; court did not abuse discretion in terminating after motion by Aron.
Did deletion of the right-of-first-refusal violate due process (notice and opportunity to be heard)?	Williams: deletion occurred without adequate notice or fair opportunity to object at the evidentiary hearing.	Aron/court: court announced intention to delete at hearing and invited objections; none were made.	Affirmed — court gave notice and an opportunity to object at the hearing and status conference; no due-process violation.

Green v. Swiers, 920 N.W.2d 471 (N.D. 2018) (sets material-change and best-interests standards for modifying parenting time)
Wolt v. Wolt, 803 N.W.2d 534 (N.D. 2011) (defines material change in circumstances)
Curtiss v. Curtiss, 886 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 2016) (district courts must state findings with sufficient specificity)
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1998) (appellate reliance on implied findings is permissible)
Prchal v. Prchal, 795 N.W.2d 693 (N.D. 2011) (standard of review for terminating a parenting coordinator is abuse of discretion)
Reinecke v. Griffeth, 533 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1995) (collecting cases where implied findings were relied upon)