Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
1:15-cv-00164
S.D. Ala.Oct 7, 2015Background
- Fannie Mae owned a mortgage on Williams’s residence; Wells Fargo serviced the loan and was assigned the mortgage and possession of the note solely to conduct a foreclosure sale on Fannie Mae’s behalf.
- Fannie Mae purchased the property at foreclosure for an amount that only satisfied the indebtedness; Wells Fargo delivered a foreclosure deed to Fannie Mae and possession of the note reverted to Fannie Mae after the sale.
- Williams vacated the property but retained her statutory right of redemption; within the redemption period Fannie Mae resold the property to a third party for about $122,000 more than the indebtedness.
- Williams sued under Alabama law seeking recovery of the excess proceeds from the resale.
- Defendants removed the case and moved to dismiss, arguing Alabama law imposes no duty on a mortgagee to remit resale excess to the mortgagor during the redemption period; the court denied the motion to dismiss, relying on Springer and Davis to conclude a mortgagee must remit excess proceeds.
- Defendants then moved to certify the controlling state-law question to the Alabama Supreme Court; the district court denied certification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a mortgagee who resells foreclosed property during the statutory redemption period and receives more than the indebtedness must remit the excess to the mortgagor | Williams: Alabama law (Springer, Davis) requires a mortgagee/mortgage purchaser who resells for a profit during redemption to apply or remit excess to reduce/return to mortgagor | Defendants: No duty to remit; Wells Fargo served only as assignee/servicer, and Fannie Mae was not a mortgagee for this purpose after assignment; public-policy arguments against imposing such a duty | Court denied certification; held existing Alabama authorities (Springer, Davis) support remitting excess and certification unnecessary because the question is not determinative and state law is sufficiently clear |
Key Cases Cited
- Springer v. Baldwin County Fed. Sav. Bank, 562 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1989) (mortgagee-purchaser who resells during redemption must apply excess to reduce mortgagor's debt)
- Davis v. Huntsville Production Credit Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 1103 (Ala. 1985) (mortgagee receiving more than indebtedness at foreclosure must deliver excess to mortgagor)
- Smigiel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 785 F.2d 922 (11th Cir. 1986) (federal courts have discretion to certify state-law questions)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (factors for deciding whether to certify state-law questions)
- Escareno v. Noltina Crucible & Refractory Corp., 139 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (federal courts should exercise restraint in certifying state-law questions)
- First Ala. Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1979) (certification improper when question addresses only one of multiple alternative dispositive theories)
