Williams v. Superior Court
230 Cal. App. 4th 636
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Williams was arrested May 20, 2014 for absconding from parole and held on a parole hold in Orange County.
- A May 20 probable cause determination identified the violation and an eight-day delay occurred before a report was submitted.
- Parole petitioned for revocation on May 29, 9 days after arrest, with arraignment originally set for June 5 (16 days after arrest).
- The Orange County court calendaring policy limited hearings to Thursdays, delaying hearings and restricting defense witnesses to final hearings.
- Realignment (2011–2012) created a uniform procedure for revocation of parole, probation, and postrelease supervision under § 1203.2, shifting oversight to courts and county agencies.
- Section 3044, enacted as Prop. 9, later provided specific time limits for Morrissey-like due process (15-day probable cause, 45-day final hearing) in parole revocation proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing required within a fixed time after arrest in post-realignment parole revocation? | Williams asserts a 15-day probable cause hearing is required. | People argue post-realignment case law does not require a Morrissey hearing within 15 days. | Yes; a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing within 15 days is required. |
| What arraignment timing is constitutionally permissible for parolees held on parole violations? | Williams seeks arraignment within 48 hours of arrest. | No fixed 48-hour arraignment requirement exists post-realignment. | An arraignment within 10 days after arrest is appropriate as an outer limit. |
| Should final revocation hearings occur within a fixed timeframe after arrest? | Final revocation within 45 days is necessary for timely adjudication. | System already aims for prompt hearings; no fixed 45-day requirement stated. | Final revocation hearing within 45 days of arrest is required. |
| Must parole authorities consider intermediate sanctions (including flash incarceration) before seeking revocation? | Parole must consider full range of sanctions within a short period before petition for revocation. | Parole has discretion; no binding short-time mandate proven by record. | Court cannot compel a specific one-day consideration; record insufficient to order procedural changes beyond ensuring reasons for sanctions are stated. |
| Must parolees have timely access to counsel and notice before probable cause hearings? | Due process requires prompt access to counsel and notice before hearings. | Access/time considered with system-wide reforms; no automatic 48-hour window. | Parolees entitled to timely counsel access and notice prior to the probable cause hearing; not time-fixed at 48 hours. |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 472 (U.S. 1972) (parole revocation requires due process protections including probable cause and final hearing)
- Coleman v. People, 13 Cal.3d 867 (Cal. 1975) (probation revocation procedures may differ from parole; unitary hearings may suffice with safeguards)
- Woodall v. People, 216 Cal.App.4th 1221 (Cal. App. 2013) (prompts Morrissey-compliant hearing considerations under §1203.2 post-realignment)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (two-stage parole/probation revocation proceedings; minimum due process protections)
- Vickers v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 451 (Cal. 1972) (due process protections for probation revocation; Morrissey safeguards apply to uniform revocation procedures)
- People v. Hughes, 27 Cal.4th 287 (Cal. 2002) (arrest timing and appearance concepts in parole-related contexts)