Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 404

In December 2008, 16-year-old Brodrick Williams (Appellant) rode with Tavaris Samuels and two women; Appellant carried a 9mm, Samuels a .22.
Appellant approached Daniel McGee, pointed a gun, and demanded McGee’s gold chain; a struggle ensued and a single .22 shot to McGee’s head proved fatal.
Samuels admitted (to police and at trial) he fired the fatal shot; Appellant later admitted he demanded the chain, tussled with McGee, and lost his magazine during the fight.
Samuels pled guilty to murder and related charges and agreed to testify against Appellant pursuant to a plea deal; both were represented by attorneys from the same public defender’s office.
Appellant was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and a firearm offense; he appeals arguing (1) insufficient evidence (particularly as to armed robbery) and (2) violation of his right to conflict-free counsel because counsel did not withdraw.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the murder and firearm convictions, reversed the armed robbery conviction, and held Appellant did not prove an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for malice murder and firearm offense	Evidence insufficient to prove Appellant was a party to murder or possession	Appellant was a party: carried a gun, demanded the chain, tussled, then left with Samuels who fired	Affirmed: Evidence sufficient to convict Appellant as a party to malice murder and firearm offense
Sufficiency of evidence for armed robbery (taking element)	Chain and pendant were taken by Appellant during the robbery	No evidence Appellant moved or exercised control over the chain/pendant; chain remained with victim’s clothing	Reversed: Insufficient evidence of "taking" and dominion for armed robbery conviction
Right to conflict-free counsel based on same-office representation	Trial counsel should have withdrawn after co-defendant’s plea and expected testimony; this created a conflict	Counsel did not assert an actual conflict, received leave to argue, cross-examined vigorously; no evidence representation was hampered	Affirmed: No actual conflict shown that adversely affected counsel’s performance; no Sixth Amendment violation
Remedy if counsel had an actual conflict	(Appellant seeks reversal/new trial)	(State) Denies actual conflict; argues no adverse effect on representation	Court: If actual conflict that adversely affected counsel exists, automatic reversal; but here none proved, so no remedy granted

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (timely assertion of multiple-representation conflict typically requires inquiry/withdrawal)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (must show counsel actively represented conflicting interests to establish Sixth Amendment violation)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (actual conflict defined as one that adversely affects counsel’s performance)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance framework distinguishing outcome-prejudice inquiry)
Gutierrez v. State, 290 Ga. 643 (Georgia standard for proving "taking" and dominion in robbery)
Abernathy v. State, 289 Ga. 603 (examples of conflicts that demonstrate adverse effect on counsel)
Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161 (Georgia precedent on viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict)