Williams v. State
296 Ga. 817
| Ga. | 2015Background
- On Sept. 22, 2012, Williams was stopped, had reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for arrest for DUI; he was placed in custody and not Mirandized.
- Officer read Georgia’s age‑21+ implied consent warning, asked a “yes or no” question whether Williams would submit to state‑administered blood and urine tests, and Williams said “yes.”
- No warrant was obtained and the State concedes there were no exigent circumstances.
- Blood and urine samples were taken at a medical facility and later used in prosecution; Williams moved to suppress the blood-test results as an unconstitutional warrantless search.
- Trial court denied the suppression motion, treating statutory implied consent as sufficient; Georgia Supreme Court vacated and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Williams gave actual, voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statutory implied‑consent compliance constitutes voluntary Fourth Amendment consent to a warrantless blood draw | Williams: mere compliance with implied‑consent statute is not actual voluntary consent; statute as applied unconstitutional | State: statutory implied consent satisfied consent exception and justified sampling without a warrant | Court: Mere statutory implied‑consent compliance does not automatically equal voluntary consent; trial court must assess voluntariness under the totality of circumstances |
| Whether the natural dissipation of alcohol alone creates a per se exigency permitting warrantless blood draws | Williams: no exigency existed here; per se rule invalid | State: historic Georgia precedent held dissipation creates exigency | Court: Overruled Strong to the extent it created a per se rule; exigency is case‑by‑case per McNeely; no exigency here |
| Burden of proof to justify warrantless blood draw when no warrant obtained | Williams: State must prove an exception (exigency or valid consent) | State: relied on implied‑consent statutory scheme | Court: State bears burden to show exception; here must prove actual voluntary consent or other exception; remand for factual finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless intrusions into the body implicate special privacy interests; exigency based on dissipating blood‑alcohol may justify blood draw in specific emergencies)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (rejects per se exigency rule for metabolization of alcohol; exigency must be assessed case‑by‑case)
- Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282 (2003) (Georgia: compelled blood extraction is a search; State must prove consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances when relying on consent exception)
- Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514 (1973) (overruled in part) (held dissipation of alcohol created exigency as a matter of law for warrantless blood draws)
- Cornwell v. State, 283 Ga. 247 (2008) (addressed statutory implied consent but did not eliminate the distinction between implied consent and actual voluntary consent)
- Slaughter v. State, 252 Ga. 435 (1984) (warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable; State has burden to justify exception)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search must be voluntarily given under totality of circumstances)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent is invalid if obtained through assertion of authority or coercion)