322 F. Supp. 3d 896
N.D. Ind.2018Background
- Plaintiff Ja'Lin Williams was struck and seriously injured by a Norfolk Southern freight train at the 117th Street crossing in Whiting, Indiana on June 23, 2013, after leaving a nearby park and attempting to cross five sets of tracks on foot.
- The train crew (engineer and conductor Paul Wansitler) observed Williams and two friends running toward the tracks; they alerted the engineer ~13 seconds before impact but did not initiate emergency braking until at/near impact.
- Experts testified that braking initiated within nine seconds of impact would not have prevented the collision; braking earlier (more than nine seconds before impact, ~525 feet away) would have avoided the accident.
- Warning devices (flashing lights, gates), bell, headlight, and horn were operating and the horn was sounded consistent with federal rules; one friend made it across, another stopped short, only Williams was struck.
- Norfolk moved for summary judgment arguing federal preemption of certain claims, lack of breach/proximate cause for negligence, and that Williams’ contributory fault exceeded 50% barring recovery under Indiana law. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Norfolk.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal preemption of crossing-design, warning-device, and horn-sounding claims | Williams alleged inadequate warnings, extra-hazardous crossing, and inadequate horn | Norfolk: federal statutes/regulations preempt state tort claims once federal devices are installed and operating | Court: preempted; Williams abandoned response—summary judgment for Norfolk on these claims |
| Excessive-speed claim/preemption exception | Williams alleged excessive speed / argues exception where train fails to slow for a specific, individual hazard | Norfolk: train speed (~40 mph) was below federal limit (60 mph), so speed claims are preempted; but concedes exception for failure to slow for a specific hazard | Court: speed claim preempted except for negligence claim based on duty to slow/stop for a specific, individual hazard |
| Duty to slow/stop for specific, individual hazard (negligence) | Williams: crew saw pedestrians running toward the track; duty to stop arose when conductor first observed them | Norfolk: crew reasonably presumed pedestrians would yield given functioning warnings; duty to brake arises only when collision is apparent and avoidable | Court: genuine dispute exists on when duty arose, but even assuming duty arose earlier, plaintiff must still overcome contributory-fault issue; summary judgment denied on this narrow duty issue alone but other grounds dispose of case |
| Contributory fault (Indiana Comparative Fault Act) | Williams: apportionment is a jury question | Norfolk: undisputed evidence shows Williams failed to exercise due care and was over 50% at fault, barring recovery | Court: as a matter of law Williams breached duty of ordinary care (did not look, knew warnings, was adult); his fault exceeds defendants’ and bars recovery — summary judgment for Norfolk |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden and Rule 56 principles)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and assessing genuine disputes)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (federal preemption of state claims re: railroad speed and safety matters)
- Thiele v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179 (7th Cir. standard for finding plaintiff >50% at fault as a matter of law)
- Reales v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. affirming summary judgment where plaintiff’s fault exceeded railroad’s)
- Eubanks v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 875 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. discussion of duty to brake for pedestrians and preemption issues)