Williams v. Housing Authority
124 A.3d 537
Conn. App. Ct.2015Background
- Fire in the decedents’ affordable-housing apartment resulted in five deaths; apartment had limited egress and no fire escapes; fire inspections in Bridgeport are mandated by statute § 29-305(b) and overseen by the fire marshal’s office; the list of properties to inspect did not include affordable housing on tax rolls; plaintiff alleges failures to inspect and to remedy code defects (fire safety, building codes).
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing immunity under § 52-557n and that other acts were discretionary; the trial court granted summary judgment as to § 52-557n(b)(8) recklessness and found other acts discretionary under § 52-557n(a)(2)(B).
- Rooney and Cosgrove affirmed familiarity with inspection rules but Rooney later testified that the department had a statutory duty to inspect affordable housing; the court remanded to consider Haynes v. Middletown, which redefines imminent harm in the identifiable person-imminent harm context.
- Trial court used Burns v. Board of Education foreseeability framework for imminent harm; appellate court determines Haynes establishes a four-pronged test for imminent harm and remands for reanalysis under that standard.
- Court notes the case’s retroactivity question: Haynes is applied retroactively to this case, and the matter is remanded for proper consideration under Haynes with submissions tailored to the updated standard.
- The Housing Authority is not a party on appeal; the opinion discusses multiple Bridgeport officials’ duties and potential immunities, focusing on inspection duties and discretionary vs ministerial obligations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recklessness standard under §52-557n(b)(8) | Recklessness is a fact issue. | Recklessness is a question of law. | Recklessness is a legal question; remand for factual application under Haynes. |
| Discretionary vs ministerial duties under §52-557n(a)(2)(B) | Claims involve ministerial duties; immunity should not bar relief. | Most alleged negligence involved discretionary duties; immune. | Most alleged negligence are discretionary; inspection duty is ministerial and not immune; remand for proper analysis. |
| Identifiable person-imminent harm under Haynes v. Middletown | Haynes should apply to extend the exception to discretionary acts. | Haynes does not apply or limits the exception. | Remand to determine applicability of Haynes four-pronged test to the alleged discretionary acts. |
| Retroactivity of Haynes in this case | Retroactive application of Haynes appropriate; remand for proper analysis under the new standard. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 (1991) (statutory immunity ambiguity; context for § 52-557n)
- Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 (2014) (redefined imminent harm; four-pronged Haynes test)
- Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 (1994) (foreseeability approach previously used for imminent harm (overruled))
- Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 (1989) (imminence tied to magnitude of risk (historical standard))
- Smigelski v. Dubois, 153 Conn. App. 186 (2014) (summary judgment standard; burden on nonmovant)
- Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364 (2007) (plain meaning of § 52-557n(b)(8); notice vs recklessness distinction)
- Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150 (2014) (ministerial vs discretionary acts; immunity scope)
- Segreto v. Bristol, 71 Conn. App. 844 (2002) (discretionary acts; essence of reasonableness in enforcement)
- Smart v. Corbitt, 126 Conn. App. 788 (2011) (insufficient recklessness evidence; duty to inspect)
- Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 (2006) ( exceptions to discretionary immunity; intent/wantonness not at issue here)