Williams v. Gregory Leonard, Lakeshore Recycling Sys., LLC
96 N.E.3d 503
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs originally filed personal‑injury claims against Leonard and his employers; after pretrial rulings (including denial of a late jury demand and dismissal of employer‑defendants on some counts) plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case (Williams I).
- Plaintiffs promptly refiled the same cause of action (Williams II) adding only a jury demand; the refiled case was assigned to the same trial judge under an administrative order.
- Defendant Leonard moved for a substitution of judge as of right under 735 ILCS 5/2‑1001(a)(2); plaintiffs objected relying on Bowman v. Ottney and the administrative assignment.
- The trial court, construing Bowman, denied defendant’s motion and allowed an interlocutory appeal; the trial court stayed further proceedings pending appeal.
- The appellate court affirms: applying Bowman, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses and then refiles the same cause of action and the same judge previously made substantial rulings in the earlier proceedings, neither party may obtain a substitution of judge as of right in the refiled case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a party (here defendant) may obtain a substitution of judge as of right in a refiled action assigned to the same judge who made prior substantial rulings | Williams: Bowman prevents substitution as of right where the same judge made substantial prior rulings in the related proceedings | Leonard: Section 2‑1001(a)(2) permits a timely substitution; Bowman should not strip a defendant of the right when defendant did not engage in dismissal/refiling maneuvering | Court: Bowman applies to both parties — a refiled case is not "new" for §2‑1001 purposes; substitution as of right is unavailable where the same judge made prior substantial rulings |
| Whether voluntary dismissal + refiling "resets the clock" for the timeliness requirement for substitution of judge | Williams: Refiling does not reset the right; prior substantial rulings count against substitution timeliness | Leonard: Refiling is a new action for purposes of substitution (especially when refiling corrects a procedural defect) | Court: Refiling does not reset the clock for §2‑1001; the statute must be read to include prior proceedings on the same cause of action |
| Whether Bowman is limited to plaintiffs who engaged in "judge shopping" or applies more broadly | Williams: Bowman broadly empowers trial courts to deny substitutions in refilings regardless of which party moves | Leonard: Bowman should be limited to plaintiffs who voluntarily dismissed to judge‑shop; defendant should not be penalized | Court: Bowman is not so limited; its reasoning is grounded in the single‑cause‑of‑action and timeliness principles and applies equally to either party |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion/erred in denying Leonard’s motion | Williams: Denial proper under Bowman and §2‑1001 timeliness rule | Leonard: Motion met statutory requirements and was timely in the refiled case | Court: No error — denial affirmed; substitution as of right was untimely because the judge had made substantial rulings in the same cause of action previously |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowman v. Ottney, 2015 IL 119000 (Ill. 2015) (holding that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses and then refiles the same cause, a court may deny an immediate motion for substitution of judge as of right if the same judge made substantive rulings in the earlier proceedings)
- Moore v. Chicago Park District, 2012 IL 112788 (Ill. 2012) (Rule 308 interlocutory appeal scope and limits)
- In re Adoption of A.W., 343 Ill. App. 3d 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (principle of construing supreme court opinions for breadth and applicability)
- Scroggins v. Scroggins, 327 Ill. App. 3d 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (defining timeliness for substitution as presented before trial and before judge ruled on substantial issue)
- In re Marriage of Roach, 245 Ill. App. 3d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (discussion of the meaning of "timely" under §2‑1001 and the elimination of prejudice requirement)