Williams v. District of Columbia
818 F. Supp. 2d 197
D.D.C.2011Background
- Williams sues the District of Columbia for retaliation under the DC-WPA stemming from her February 14, 2006 testimony before the DC Council.
- The case is in pretrial; Williams moved for Jury Instruction No. 2 to track the statutory definition of 'whistleblower' as 'an employee who makes or is perceived to have made a protected disclosure.'
- DC-WPA defines a whistleblower as 'an employee who makes or is perceived to have made a protected disclosure,' while the liability provision prohibits retaliation for the employee's protected disclosure.
- The District argues Williams must show a actual protected disclosure, while Williams contends the statute allows recovery based on being perceived to have made a disclosure.
- The court concludes the dispute is inapplicable here because Williams did disclose; the core issue is whether that disclosure was 'protected' based on the employee's reasonable belief.
- The court denies Williams’ requested jury instruction and clarifies that the relevant inquiry is Williams’ reasonable belief that her testimony evidences a protected disclosure, not the employer’s perception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Should the jury instruction track 'whistleblower' as 'perceived disclosure'? | Williams: definition should be tracked. | District: liability does not hinge on 'perceived' in the liability provision. | Denied; instruction not appropriate. |
| Is a 'protected disclosure' proven by actual facts or by the employee's reasonable belief thereof? | Williams: reasonable belief suffices. | District: requires actual protected disclosure evidence. | Protected disclosure requires reasonable belief; actual disclosure not required. |
| Is the employer's perception relevant to the protection analysis? | Perception could matter under DC-WPA. | Perception by employer is irrelevant to protectedness. | Employer’s perception is irrelevant to whether the disclosure was protected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilburn v. District of Columbia, 957 A.2d 921 (D.C.2008) (protected disclosure requires reasonable belief)
- Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250 (D.C.2003) (disinterested observer may determine reasonableness)
- Rhett v. Poe, 43 U.S. (1844) (U.S.) (instructions must relate to evidence; not abstract principles)
- H.R.H. Constr. Corp. v. Conroy, 411 F.2d 722 (D.C.Cir.1969) (instructions must be connected to trial evidence)
- Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549 (D.C.Cir.1993) (district court has discretion in crafting jury instructions)
- Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780 (D.C.Cir.1978) (substance of instruction must be correct in law)