43 Misc. 3d 356
N.Y. Sup. Ct.2014Background
- Petitioner Foster Williams, convicted in 1996 of rape and sodomy of a nine-year-old, was sentenced to 7–21 years and has a maximum expiration date of November 18, 2016.
- SARA added Executive Law § 259-c(14) in 2000, prohibiting parolees whose victims were under 18 from entering school grounds; the 2005 amendment expanded the scope to 1,000 feet around schools for certain offenders.
- Parole conditions imposed on Williams require him to refrain from entering school grounds and to stay within 1,000 feet of places where children congregate until 2016.
- Williams resides in Bellevue Men’s Shelter and seeks to move to housing in Manhattan but faces near-universal proximity to schools within 1,000 feet.
- Williams requested removal of the residency restriction as an ex post facto challenge; respondent maintained the 1,000-foot rule applies due to SARA and related amendments.
- Petitioner’s housing search, health and mobility issues, and reliance on Manhattan-based services and parole supervision are central to assessing practical impact of the restriction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the petition challenge the statute as unconstitutional under CPLR 78 and be heard as a combined action? | Williams contends the statute and its application are unconstitutional. | Respondent argues forArticle 78 review of application; constitutionality should be evaluated. | Combined declaratory judgment and CPLR 78 proceeding permitted. |
| Does the 1,000-foot school-ground restriction violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to Williams? | Ex post facto clause prohibits retroactive punishment affecting parolees. | Statute serves nonpunitive protective aims; not a punitive retroactive change. | Not punitive in effect; does not violate Ex Post Facto. |
| Is the restriction rationally related to a nonpunitive state objective under substantive due process? | Restriction infringes liberty without a compelling interest. | Restriction rationally protects children from potential recidivism by paroled offender. | Rationally related to permissible objective; does not offend substantive due process. |
| Does the 1,000-foot restriction unconstitutionally limit Williams' right to travel or live where he chooses as a parolee? | Right to live and travel is fundamental and restricted. | Parolee rights are conditional; restrictions permissible. | Restriction is rationally related to legitimate state objective; does not violate travel or housing rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (Supreme Court 2003) (civil/regulatory measures may be nonpunitive if framed as protective regulation)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 357 (Supreme Court 1997) (classifying civil vs. criminal punishment; danger assessment standards)
- People v. Parilla, 109 A.D.3d 20 (1st Dept 2013) (SORA-related restrictions not punitive; rational basis review applying)
- Berlin v. Evans, 31 Misc.3d 919 (Sup. Ct. NY County 2011) (court considered legislative intent behind 2005 act)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court 2000) (ex post facto analysis includes intent-effects framework)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (Supreme Court 2003) (statutes enacted to protect health and safety can be nonpunitive)