Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno
829 F.3d 118
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Mark Williams, a former Downstate Correctional Facility inmate, alleges Correction Officers Priatno and Gammone beat him on Dec. 31, 2012, causing physical and psychological injuries in violation of the Eighth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- While housed in the SHU, Williams claims he drafted a harassment grievance on Jan. 15, 2013 and gave it to a correction officer to file (per DOCCS SHU procedure), but never received a response and was later transferred; he never appealed.
- Williams sued in federal district court in Jan. 2014; defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA; the district court granted the motion.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit assessed whether the DOCCS Inmate Grievance Program was actually ‘‘available’’ to Williams under the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, focusing on Ross v. Blake’s framework for ‘‘availability.’n
- The court assumed Williams’s grievance was never filed by staff and concluded the DOCCS grievance regulations were ‘‘so opaque’’ regarding how to proceed when a grievance is unfiled/unanswered and the inmate is transferred that an ordinary prisoner could not reasonably exhaust remedies.
- Holding: the grievance process was practically incapable of use for Williams, so he is excused from further exhaustion; the Second Circuit reversed the district court and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether administrative remedies were "available" under the PLRA when Williams’s SHU grievance was allegedly never filed and he was transferred | Williams contends he gave the grievance to a CO as permitted in SHU but it was never filed; the grievance process was therefore not available | Defendants contend Williams could have appealed despite nonreceipt and transfer, and DOCCS would have guided him or provided re-filing/extension options | Held: Remedies were not "available" — DOCCS regs are too opaque re: unfiled/unanswered grievances and transfers, so exhaustion was excused |
| Whether Hemphill/Giano special-circumstances analysis still excused exhaustion post-Woodford | Williams (and precedent) argued that defendant behavior or special circumstances can render remedies unavailable and excuse exhaustion | Defendants relied on Woodford’s emphasis on ‘‘proper exhaustion’’ to argue exceptions should be narrowly applied | Held: Ross controls — special-circumstances exception as previously applied is subsumed by the narrower ‘‘availability’’ inquiry; court focuses on whether remedies were actually available |
| Whether transfer to another facility affects ability to appeal an unfiled grievance | Williams argues transfer compounded opacity because regs assume receipt of responses/appeal form and give no clear route for transferred inmates | Defendants argue transferred inmates can mail signed appeal forms back and be instructed how to proceed | Held: Transfer made exhaustion practically impossible given the regulatory scheme’s silence about appealing unfiled grievances without receiving forms/responses |
| Whether defendants met their burden to prove non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense | Williams argues defendants must point to clear procedures showing availability and they have not met that burden because the process is opaque | Defendants argue many courts require appeal of a nonresponse and that an inmate’s allegation alone cannot excuse exhaustion | Held: Defendants failed to meet initial burden; regulations and their application here show remedies were practically unavailable |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (PLRA exhaustion fails when administrative remedies are not "available," including where procedures are a "dead end," "opaque," or subject to administrator obstruction)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA requires "proper exhaustion," i.e., compliance with procedural rules and deadlines)
- Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (articulated multi-part test for excusing exhaustion based on availability, estoppel, and special circumstances)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA; inmates need not plead exhaustion in the complaint)
- Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognized limited ‘‘special circumstances’’ basis for excusing exhaustion prior to Ross)