Williams v. City of Burns
465 S.W.3d 96
Tenn.2015Background
- Captain Larry Williams, a longtime officer and second‑in‑command in the Burns, TN Police Department, drafted and circulated a policy forbidding "ticket fixing." After stopping Chief Sumerour’s stepson for speeding, Williams was pressured by the Chief to convert two citations into warnings; Williams initially refused but relented under pressure and later restored the citations and reported the Chief’s conduct to the Mayor.
- The Chief learned Williams had complained to the Mayor and solicited written statements from the other officers; within about three weeks the Chief disciplined and then terminated Williams, citing violation of chain‑of‑command, insubordination, and undermining the Chief’s authority.
- Williams sued the City under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA), alleging retaliatory discharge for refusing to participate in and for refusing to remain silent about illegal ticket fixing.
- The trial court found Williams had refused to participate but concluded the City had additional non‑retaliatory reasons for termination and entered judgment for the City; the Court of Appeals reversed, finding reporting to the Mayor was protected and the City’s asserted reasons were pretextual.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: ticket fixing is illegal under state law; reporting it to the Mayor was TPPA‑protected whistleblowing; the City’s chain‑of‑command rationale amounted to an admission of retaliatory motive; and the record preponderates that retaliation was the sole reason for the discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Williams' Argument | City of Burns' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ticket fixing constitutes "illegal activity" under the TPPA | Ticket fixing is illegal under state statutes and thus protected conduct to refuse to participate in | Denied or disputed the characterization (argued Williams' conduct did not amount to protected refusal/reporting) | Held: ticket fixing is illegal and within TPPA protection |
| Whether reporting the Chief to the Mayor (going "outside chain of command") is protected "refusal to remain silent" | Speaking to the Mayor about the Chief’s illegal conduct is protected whistleblowing; plaintiffs need not show they were expressly told to be silent | Argued violation of chain‑of‑command justified termination (non‑retaliatory reason) | Held: reporting to the Mayor was protected; treating chain‑of‑command violation as a basis for discharge was effectively an admission of retaliation and cannot stand |
| Whether the City proffered legitimate, non‑retaliatory reasons and whether those reasons were pretextual | City’s reasons were pretext; direct admission that reporting motivated the firing plus circumstantial evidence (timing, heightened scrutiny) show sole motive was retaliation | Asserted non‑retaliatory motives: insubordination, undermining chief’s authority, bad‑mouthing to co‑workers and Mayor | Held: although City produced some evidence of non‑retaliatory motive, the totality of the record (including Chief’s admission, temporal proximity, heightened scrutiny, inconsistent accounts) shows those reasons were pretext and retaliation was the sole reason |
| Burden/standard for TPPA causation (sole cause) and review of trial court credibility findings | TPPA requires proof that retaliation was the sole reason; where trial court rested on erroneous legal premise appellate court may independently weigh evidence | Trial court credibility findings should be afforded deference; reversal requires clear and convincing contrary evidence | Held: because the trial court misapprehended protected conduct (excluded "refusal to remain silent"), the Court conducted an independent preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence review and concluded pretext and sole‑cause were established |
Key Cases Cited
- Chism v. Mid–South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988) (recognizing common‑law retaliatory‑discharge/public‑policy exception for refusal to participate in or remain silent about illegal acts)
- Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1997) (statute protects employees who speak out about employer’s illegal activity; no requirement employer expressly directed silence)
- Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528 (Tenn. 2002) (distinguishes common‑law standard from TPPA; TPPA requires retaliation be the sole reason)
- Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Auth., 343 S.W.3d 18 (Tenn. 2011) (discusses TPPA elements and causation standards)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for employment retaliation cases)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (U.S. 1993) (explains McDonnell Douglas as allocation of burden of production; ultimate burden remains with plaintiff)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (plaintiff retains ultimate burden of persuasion; credibility and pretext analysis)