Williams v. Borrego
5 F.4th 1129
| 10th Cir. | 2021Background:
- Charles Williams, a Colorado prisoner, practices a Native American religion that uses tobacco in sweat-lodge and other religious services; prison officials had previously designated where inmates could use tobacco for religious purposes.
- In 2018 officers confiscated tobacco and imposed a 30-day ban on tobacco use in religious services; weeks later a lockdown led to an indefinite suspension of all Native American religious services while Christian and Muslim services continued under outside-volunteer supervision.
- Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment free-exercise violations; defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved to dismiss; the district court denied the motion.
- On interlocutory appeal the defendants initially advanced factual arguments about the suspension’s duration but later conceded the complaint alleged at least a nine-day suspension (and possibly up to 30 days), giving the court jurisdiction to decide the legal issue.
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo, viewing allegations in the light most favorable to Williams, and concluded that the bans could have violated clearly established First Amendment rights, so qualified immunity was unavailable.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the indefinite suspension of Native American services (alleged at least 9 days, possibly longer) violated a clearly established free-exercise right | Williams: an intentional denial of all Native American services is a substantial burden on his sincerely held religious beliefs | Defendants: temporary suspension did not clearly impose a substantial burden; cases like Gallagher show isolated/accidental delays don’t suffice | Court: affirmed that intentional, sustained denial (and under precedent a month-long denial) is a clearly established substantial burden; denial of qualified immunity affirmed |
| Whether a 30-day ban on using tobacco for religious services violated a clearly established right to use religious objects | Williams: tobacco is a required religious object; a 30-day prohibition can substantially burden exercise of religion | Defendants: a 30-day limitation is not clearly enough established to be a substantial burden; tobacco ban was temporary | Court: precedent (Makin and related cases) clearly establishes that deprivation of religious practices or objects for 30 days can be a substantial burden; qualified immunity unavailable |
| Whether the court has appellate jurisdiction to decide qualified immunity given disputed factual duration of bans | Williams: complaint alleges at least 9 days and possibly 30 days; defendants later conceded at oral argument | Defendants: disputed number of cancelled services raises factual question beyond interlocutory jurisdiction | Court: defendants’ concession allowed review of the legal question; appellate jurisdiction exists |
Key Cases Cited
- Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (prohibition on participation in a sweat lodge constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise)
- Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1999) (month-long denial of accommodations during Ramadan can substantially burden religious exercise)
- Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (denial of access to religiously significant objects can violate the Free Exercise Clause)
- Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (isolated or negligent delays in religious accommodations do not necessarily constitute a substantial burden)
- Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing RLUIPA’s standards from Free Exercise analyses while recognizing comparable definitions of “substantial burden”)
- Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2016) (standard of review on qualified-immunity motion to dismiss; view allegations in nonmovant’s favor)
- Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2012) (definitions and evaluation of clearly established law in qualified-immunity context)
- Ralston v. Cannon, 884 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2018) (intentional interference with religious exercise can support a First Amendment violation)
