379 F. Supp. 3d 360
E.D. Pa.2019Background
- In 2005 Williams was convicted in Pennsylvania of DUI at the highest rate of intoxication with a prior, an offense classified as a first-degree misdemeanor punishable up to five years. He was sentenced in 2006 to a split term (ninety days to two years) and permitted to serve ninety days on passive house arrest.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment is prohibited from possessing firearms; Williams’ conviction thus disqualified him.
- After the conviction Williams continued to own and handle firearms through 2014 and worked at a gun store/range where he handled firearms and assisted firearm purchases. He also completed a 2007 PA firearms purchase application answering "no" to a felony-disqualification question.
- Williams brought an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), relying on Third Circuit precedent (Binderup), and both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The district court applied the Marzzarella/Barton/Binderup framework: (1) whether the statute burdens conduct within the Second Amendment (with the challenger bearing a strong burden to show the disqualifying offense is not "serious"); and (2) if so, whether the law survives intermediate scrutiny.
- The court concluded Williams carried the narrow burden at step one (his DUI was not "serious" under Binderup factors) but the Government satisfied intermediate scrutiny based on empirical evidence linking alcohol-related convictions to higher future risk of violent/firearm-related arrests; therefore the Government’s summary judgment was granted and Williams’ denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) burdens Williams' Second Amendment rights (seriousness of offense) | Williams: Second DUI at highest BAC is a misdemeanor, nonviolent, and not "serious" under Binderup factors; cross-jurisdictional data show few states treat similar conduct as felony | Gov't: Pennsylvania labeled the offense serious (max sentence); Williams received a custodial sentence and statutory maximum >1 year supports disqualification | Held: Court finds Williams met the strong burden at step one — offense is not "serious" (misdemeanor, nonviolent, cross-jurisdictional consensus favors non-serious); custodial 90-day house arrest weighed slightly for Gov't but did not defeat step one showing |
| Whether the Government meets intermediate scrutiny (fit between disarmament and public-safety interest) | Williams: Government evidence (studies) is off-point; individualized expert (Dr. Gordon) shows Williams poses no risk; prior §925 relief practice undermines categorical disarmament | Gov't: Presents expert (Dr. Webster) relying on Wintemute study showing 4–5x increased risk of violent/firearm arrests among persons with prior alcohol-related convictions; important government interest in preventing armed mayhem | Held: Gov't satisfied intermediate scrutiny — empirical evidence shows a reasonable fit between disarming persons with alcohol-related convictions (like Williams) and public-safety interest; §922(g)(1) constitutional as applied to Williams |
| Relevance of Williams’ post-conviction conduct (continued possession, alleged false statements) | Williams: Post-conviction conduct irrelevant under Binderup's step-one focus; individual rehabilitation should not substitute for categorical analysis | Gov't: Post-conviction behavior demonstrates ongoing irresponsibility and supports disarmament | Held: Court rejects Gov’t reliance on post-conviction conduct at step one (Binderup limits focus to seriousness of disqualifying offense); also declines to find criminality in this civil action; such conduct is not outcome-determinative here |
| Weight of competing expert evidence | Williams: Dr. Gordon (clinical exam) shows low individual risk; criticizes statistical generalizations | Gov't: Dr. Webster summarizes Wintemute study showing substantial increased risk tied to alcohol-related convictions | Held: Court gives weight to population-level empirical evidence (Wintemute study as presented by Webster) for intermediate-scrutiny fit; individual clinician opinion does not rebut the class-based justification required at step two |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to keep and bear arms but identifies longstanding prohibitions, including felon disarmament, as presumptively lawful)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopts two-step framework: threshold burden inquiry then intermediate scrutiny for as-applied challenges)
- United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (confirms availability of as-applied challenges and requires challengers to distinguish themselves from historically barred classes)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (synthesizes Marzzarella and Barton: challenger must show disqualifying offense is not "serious"; if so, government must satisfy intermediate scrutiny)
- Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General N.J., 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) (discusses intermediate-scrutiny fit in Second Amendment context)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholds categorical disqualifications and explains government need not make individualized showings at trial)