Williams County v. Don Sorenson Investments, LLC
2017 ND 193
| N.D. | 2017Background
- Don Sorenson Investments owns property zoned residential in Williams County; Sorenson sought a zone change to commercial in March 2015, which the County denied and ordered removal of commercial items by Aug. 1, 2015.
- County inspections found semi-trucks, gooseneck trailers, bulk fuel tanks, and shipping containers on the property; County alleged an oilfield trucking business was being operated without permission.
- County sued in October 2015 for zoning violations and maintaining a public nuisance, seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties ($1,000/day per violation).
- District court denied a preliminary injunction, finding the ordinances do not define “commercial” and that the County’s injunction request was vague.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the district court granted it, dismissed the County’s complaint, denied res judicata and spoliation claims, and declined civil penalties (contrary to the County’s contention it had only tabled that request at the preliminary injunction hearing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether administrative res judicata bars relitigation of zoning violations | County: Board’s denial of zone change already determined the violations; preclusive effect applies | Sorenson: Board decision addressed a zone-change request, not a formal adjudication of violations | Court: Administrative res judicata does not apply because the Board’s zone-change proceeding primarily addressed the zone change, not determination of violations |
| Whether County’s complaint and ordinances gave fair notice of prohibited conduct (vagueness) | County: Ordinance should be read by plain, common meaning of “commercial”; complaint sufficiently alleges non-permitted use | Sorenson: Ordinance fails to define “commercial,” “commercial operation,” or “commercial item,” so notice is inadequate | Court: District court erred to the extent it granted summary judgment based on lack of the defined term; the operative issue is whether the use is not among enumerated permitted residential uses; genuine fact issue exists |
| Whether County presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment | County: Affidavit evidence from code enforcement and business records show continued commercial use after Aug. 1, 2015 | Sorenson: Complaint lacks specificity which precludes summary judgment against them | Court: Hymer’s affidavit and supporting records created a genuine issue of material fact about violations; summary judgment for defendants reversed and case remanded |
| Whether County withdrew its request for civil penalties | County: Did not withdraw—only paused argument at preliminary injunction hearing | Sorenson: Court treated County as having withdrawn civil penalty claim | Court: County did not withdraw civil penalties; issue remains for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Tarnavsky v. Rankin, 771 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 2009) (summary judgment standards)
- Rooks v. Robb, 871 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 2015) (appellate review of summary judgment and burdens on nonmoving party)
- Cridland v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 571 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 1997) (administrative res judicata standards and cautious application)
- United Hosp. v. D’Annunzio, 466 N.W.2d 595 (N.D. 1991) (preclusive effect of local political subdivision decisions)
- Riemers v. Jaeger, 827 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 2013) (requirement for fair and precisely drawn notice in injunction context)
- State v. Ehli, 667 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 2003) (due process and notice principles)