988 N.E.2d 289
Ind. Ct. App.2013Background
- Wressell worked as a skilled cement mason for RLTC on two public works projects (Gatewood and Informatics) from Sept 15, 2009 to Jun 20, 2010.
- CCWA governed wage/fringe requirements; RLTC paid per CCWA classifications, while Wressell claimed misclassification and underpayment.
- Gatewood: 677 hours; informatics: 452.5 hours; total wage/fringe analyses showed cement mason totals vs carpenter/laborer totals for comparison.
- RLTC paid fringe benefits and other charged amounts; some credits and reimbursements were contested as fringe benefits.
- IDOL investigated but did not resolve; Attorney General authorized Wressell to pursue in court; suit filed Jan 5, 2012.
- Trial court granted RLTC summary judgment; Wressell cross-moved for summary judgment seeking reclassification and fringe-benefit reallocation; court struck portions of a key affidavit and denied Wressell’s motion, leading to appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in striking Moorhead’s fringe-benefit paragraphs. | Wressell argues the paragraphs are relevant and not legal conclusions. | RLTC contends the paragraphs were irrelevant and legal conclusions. | Abuse of discretion; paragraphs were relevant and not improper legal conclusions. |
| Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on Wressell’s job classification. | Wressell contends much of his work was carpenter/laborer, not cement mason. | RLTC argues Wressell was correctly classified as cement mason based on CCWA wages. | Genuine issue of material fact; remand for trial on classification and related wages. |
| Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on fringe-benefit payments. | Wressell asserts certain payments were not fringe benefits or were miscounted. | RLTC asserts payments complied with CCWA fringe-benefit definitions. | Genuine issue of material fact; remand to determine proper fringe-benefit payments. |
| Whether RLTC is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees on cross-appeal. | No argument of procedural bad faith; appeal not frivolous. | RLTC claims procedural bad faith and requests fees. | No award of appellate fees; court exercises restraint. |
Key Cases Cited
- Union Twp. Sch. Corp. v. State ex rel. Joyce, 706 N.E.2d 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (wages include fringe benefits under CCWA)
- Jackson v. Trancik, 953 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (review of summary judgment affidavit is abuse-of-discretion standard)
- Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010) (summary judgment standard; burden-shifting framework)
- Ind. Podiatry, P.C. v. Efroymson, 720 N.E.2d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (evidence and legal conclusions; admissibility concerns)
- Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Simrell’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (summary judgment burden on movant)
- Orr v. Turco Mfg. Co., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1987) (appellate fees under Rule 66(E) focus on meritless/bad-faith conduct)
- Tioga Pines Living Ctr., Inc. v. Indiana Family & Social Svcs. Admin., 760 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (need for restraint in awarding appellate fees)
- Boczar v. Meridian St. Found., 749 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (substantive vs procedural bad faith in appellate fees)
- Srivastava v. Watson, 779 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (pro se liability for appellate fees when violating rules)