42 F.4th 755
7th Cir.2022Background
- William Watts, a federal prisoner, sued Brazos Urethane, Inc. and Dr. Mark Kidman alleging exposure to an industrial primer and mismanaged treatment caused eye irritation that developed into glaucoma.
- Watts filed pro se and made four separate requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) for the district court to recruit pro bono counsel; each request was denied.
- The district court conducted discovery, then granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding Watts lacked expert evidence required under Wisconsin law to prove the applicable standard of care and breach, and also lacked evidence of causation.
- The district court found Watts competent to litigate (literacy, comprehension, and ability to present facts and legal arguments) and concluded that even with counsel the likelihood of a viable claim was remote.
- Watts appealed both the summary judgment and the denials of recruited counsel; the Seventh Circuit considered whether courts may factor claim strength/likelihood of success into § 1915(e)(1) recruitment decisions and reviewed the district court’s application of Pruitt v. Mote.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district courts may consider the strength/likelihood of success of a claim when deciding to recruit counsel under § 1915(e)(1) | Pruitt’s two-step test limits inquiry to efforts to obtain counsel and the plaintiff’s competence, excluding a merits-based assessment | District courts may consider merits/likelihood of success as one practical factor in allocating scarce pro bono resources | Yes. Courts may assess perceived merits/likelihood of success, but must do so cautiously and generously when reviewing uncounseled pleadings |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Watts’s four motions for recruited counsel | Watts argued the denials were erroneous and that counsel was necessary to obtain experts and litigate his claims | The district court applied Pruitt, found Watts competent and his claims unlikely to succeed even with counsel; thus denial was reasonable | No abuse of discretion; denials affirmed |
| Whether summary judgment was proper on Watts’s negligence claims (need for expert testimony and causation) | Watts contended factual disputes and that counsel/expert could establish standard of care and causation | Defendants argued Watts failed to present expert proof of applicable standard/breach and of causation required under Wisconsin law | Summary judgment affirmed: expert testimony was required and absent, and causation evidence was insufficient |
| Whether the denial of counsel was prejudicial (would counsel likely have changed the outcome) | Watts argued counsel could have procured expert testimony and altered the result | Court held that even with counsel, the record did not show a reasonable likelihood of success to justify allocating limited pro bono and expert resources | Denial not prejudicial; no reasonable likelihood counsel would have changed outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (two-step test for recruiting counsel under § 1915(e)(1): efforts to obtain counsel and plaintiff competence vs. case difficulty)
- Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981) (earlier precedent instructing courts to consider merits/likelihood of success when appointing counsel)
- Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1993) (streamlined inquiry focusing on whether given the case difficulty the plaintiff appears competent to litigate)
- Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (statute authorizes discretionary, not coerced, appointment of counsel)
- Pickett v. Chicago Transit Authority, 930 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2019) (permitting courts to consider why counsel declined and the relative strength of the claim)
- McCaa v. Hamilton, 959 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2020) (courts may use available information and experience to assess case merits when prioritizing pro bono resources)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standards referenced in discussion of § 1915 screening)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards referenced in discussion of § 1915 screening)